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Attilio Andreini
The Yang Mo 楊墨 dualism and the rhetorical 
construction of heterodoxy
Abstract: The Mengzi 孟子 (The Book of Mencius) served as a constant model of 
doctrinal argumentation and style for centuries. One of the distinctive traits that 
emerges from the work is the image of Mencius struggling against the disorder 
arising from the increasing influence of the heretical doctrines of Yang Zhu 楊朱 
(ca. 4th century BC) and Mo Di 墨翟 (ca . 480–390 BC). It deserves particular atten-
tion, as the authors of the Mengzi – or perhaps even Mencius himself – carved a 
rhetorical strategy of strong emotional impact, hyperbolic in its very nature, 
based on the “moral balance” (zhong 中) of the Ru 儒 (Classicists) tradition com-
pared to both the egoism (wei wo 為我) promoted by Yang Zhu and the vitiated 
form of indiscriminate and unbalanced concern for others supported by Mo Di’s 
followers.
  To date, the Mengzi seems to be the first text in which the “Yang Mo 楊墨” 
symbol for Yang (Zhu) and Mo (Di) occurs. It became proverbial in Chinese litera-
ture for the two prototypes of ethical drift from which traditions that had allegedly 
strayed from the Ru should be retracted. The importance of both thinkers within 
a Mencian framework is evident: it is around these two figures that the text struc-
tures a highly sophisticated rhetorical framework, characterized by implicit and 
explicit strategies of inventio and dispositio.
DOI 10.1515/asia-2014-0047
1  Mencius  versus Yang-Mo 楊墨
When analyzing the symbol “Yang Mo 楊墨” (i.e. Yang Zhu 楊朱 and Mo Di 
墨翟),1 the Mengzi 孟子 (The Book of Mencius) should be taken as the starting 
point, not only because it is probably the most ancient textual witness to this 
expression, but mainly because the status the two thinkers assumed is, partly at 
least, due to their profiles outlined in the Mengzi. In the case of Yang Zhu (ca. 
1 For a detailed investigation on the meaning of the Yang-Mo symbol, see Lyell 1962.
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395–335 B.C.) in particular, the influence of the Mengzi’s judgment is even more 
significant: his egoism2 (wei wo 為我 “to act for one’s own sake” or “each one for 
himself”) has become proverbial on the basis of the Mengzi.
Yang Zhu is probably most famous because of the criticism he suffered, rather 
than for his actual influence on pre-imperial thought. Mencius (Meng Ke 孟軻, ca. 
390–305 B.C.)3 affirmed that “the doctrines of Yang Zhu and Mo Di (ca. 480–390 
B.C.) fill the world”,4 but there is no proof that these words reflected reality. In 
fact, Mencius considered Yang’s doctrine to be one of the most dangerous soph-
istries with which he was forced to contend, and the Mengzi probably overstressed 
the impact of Yang Zhu’s theories to reinforce its strenuous defense of the Ru 儒 
“Classicists’ ” doctrines. In A.C. Graham’s (1919–1991) view, Yang’s intervention in 
the philosophical debates of 4th century B.C. “provoked a metaphysical crisis 
which threatened the basic assumptions of the Confucians and Mohism and set 
them in new courses”.5 Unfortunately, the impact of his theories is hard to mea-
sure. No Yangzi 楊子 (Book of Master Yang) survives, and what little information 
there is about Yang Zhu comes from a handful of anecdotes and quotations, 
mostly presented in hostile sources such as the Mengzi, the Han Feizi 韓非子 
(Book of Master Han Fei) and the “Waipian” 外篇 (Outer Chapters) of the Zhuangzi 
莊子 (The Book of Master Zhuang), together with a few later writings thought to 
be derived from his original teaching. A.C. Graham already stressed the benefits 
of taking “Yang Zhu” as a label instead of a historical figure, and to take “Yangism” 
as a broad lineage of thought not necessarily inspired by him. There is no doubt 
that the label “Yang Zhu” has been applied to different theories throughout the 
history of Chinese thought, depending on the forms of the dialectic between the 
Ru and their opponents.
The general picture emerging from the analysis of pre-Qin 秦 (221–210 B.C.), 
Han 漢 (206 B.C.–220 A.D.) and Wei-Jin 魏晉 (A.D. 265–420) sources is contradic-
tory to the point that it seems to present a multiplicity of characters under the 
label “Yang Zhu”.6 In the light of the Mengzi, Mencius himself said that “though 
2 Graham 1989: 61.
3 By using “Mencius” I am referring to the literary portrait of Meng Ke emerging from the Mengzi, 
which is not necessarily depicted in the historical persona Meng Ke, who might or might not have 
been directly involved as the author of the received version of the Mengzi.
4 Mengzi 3B/9.
5 On the Yangist’s contribution to a “metaphysical crisis” by introducing a doctrine about 
human nature (xing 性) based on individualistic and egoistic (wei wo 為我) assumptions, see 
Graham 1985; 1986b: 13–22; 1989: 53–64, 107–111; see also Scarpari 1991: 88. For a different inter-
pretation which attenuates Yang Zhu’s impact on a the philosophical debate in early China, see 
Andreini 2000: 66–80, Eno 1984: 370–371; 1990: 257–258 n. 41; Hansen 1992: 156–157, 162, 181, 195, 
204, 397.
6 See Andreini 2000 for a deeply “contextualized” interpretation of Yang Zhu’s thought.
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he [Yang Zhu] might have benefited the whole world by plucking out a single hair, 
he would not have done it”.7 Mencius remarked that “Yang’s principle of ‘each 
one for himself’ (wei wo) is disrespectful of [the allegiance due to] the sovereign 
(wu jun 無君)”.8 So, in Mencius’s view, Yang Zhu was a radical egoist, an “anar-
chist”, while, according to the Zhuangzi, he was a dangerous sophist.9 The Han 
Feizi indirectly refers to him by criticizing his ideas, although admitting their high 
moral value. The “Yang Zhu” chapter from the Liezi 列子 (The Book of Master Lie) 
is another crucial source. This chapter, which is thematically distinct from the 
rest of the Liezi (where Yang Zhu sometimes appears as a shy, timid, beardless 
disciple of Lao Dan 老聃, and sometimes as an hedonist), has been considered as 
reflective of a pessimistic, cynical perspective and many scholars have dated the 
section to circa 300 A.D.10 However we should not rule out the possibility that the 
“Yang Zhu” chapter and a few other fragments from the chapter “Shuo fu” 說符 
(Explaining Conjunctions) include some early elements of the Yangist corpus of 
ideas.11
Mencius’ account of Yang Zhu is only apparently analogous to the Lüshi 
Chunqiu’s 呂氏春秋 (The Annals of Lü Buwei, ca. 240 B.C.) statement that Yang 
Sheng 陽生 (i.e. Yang Zhu) advocated the principle of “valuing himself ( gui ji 
貴己)”,12 and also to the Huainanzi 淮南子 (The Masters of Huainan, ca. 139 B.C.) 
account, which says that “the complete realization of one’s natural tendencies, 
the preservation of what is genuine, and not allowing external things to entangle 
one’s person are what Master Yang maintained and Mencius refused”.13 A close 
comparison of the statements about Yang Zhu shows that there are slight, but 
nevertheless important, differences between the Mengzi’s and some of Liezi’s 
account on the one hand, which both portray a Yang Zhu advocating radical self-
ishness and hedonism, and other sources like Huainanzi and Lüshi Chunqiu on 
7 拔一毛而利天下，不為也。 Mengzi 7A/26, transl. Legge 1895: 464, transl. mod. auct. Here, 
and in all other instances of passages quoted from the Mengzi below the translation is from 
James Legge (1815–1897), according to Legge 1895. Legge translations have been retranscribed 
into pinyin throughout the remainder of this paper.
8 Mengzi 3B/9, transl. Legge 1895: 282, transl. mod. auct.
9 Zhuangzi 8/22/10, 10/25/17, 10/25/19.
10 During the late-nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century the authenticity of 
the Liezi was challenged by several scholars, like Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), Ma Xulun 
馬敍倫 (1885–1970), Yang Bojun 楊伯峻 (1909–1992), Derk Bodde (1909–2003). See Bodde 1959; 
Graham 1961; Liang Qichao 1922: 68–81; Ma Xulun 1933; Yang Bojun in Liezi ji shi 列子集釋 1979: 
1–6, 323–350; In recent times the argument about the spurious nature of the Liezi has re-emerged 
in Tan Jiajian 譚家健 2000, Yang Yiliu 楊漪柳 2004, and Zhang Cangshou 章滄授 1994.
11 Graham 1959; 1960: 148–149, 153–154, 174–177; 1961.
12 Lüshi Chunqiu 17.7/107/4.
13 全性保真，不以物累形，楊子之所立也，而孟子非之。 Huainanzi 13/7a.
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the other. The differences will appear even sharper in the light of the following 
passage from the Han Feizi, where Yang Zhu is not mentioned but his theories 
seem to be called into question: 
今有人於此，義不入危城，不處軍旅，不以天下大利易其脛一毛，世主必從而禮之，貴其
智而高其行，以為輕物重生之士也。夫上所以陳良田大宅，設爵祿，所以易民死命也。今
上尊貴輕物重生之士，而索民之出死而重殉上事，不可得也。
Suppose we have a man and he regards it as right and proper never to enter a city in danger, 
and he does not engage in military activities, and he would not swap a hair on his shin for 
the benefit of the world (or “in exchange for the great benefit of possessing the whole 
world”). The rulers of our time are bound to treat him with respect because of this, they will 
set store by his wisdom and regard his moral demeanour highly, and they will consider him 
a freeman who takes external things lightly and considers life as important. Now the reason 
why the ruler offers good agricultural land and large mansions, and establishes ranks and 
stipends is because it makes it easy for the people to sacrifice their lives when ordered to do 
so. Now if the leader honors gentlemen who take external things lightly and who consider 
life as important and then hopes that the people will go out and sacrifice their lives and 
value dying for the leader, that is quite impossible.14
At least two main points arise from this: 
1) The principle of “does not give a hair of one’s shin in exchange for the great 
benefit of possessing the whole world” is substantially different from what 
Mencius testifies concerning Yang Zhu, i.e. that he would refuse “to benefit 
the whole world by plucking out a single hair”;
2) “A gentleman who values life and disregards external things” is in a position 
to avoid submission to the ruler, because he is not induced to risk his life to 
get any reward in terms of fame, honor, or valuable things. That kind of 
person refuses to engage himself in external matters and thus to become a 
tool in the hands of the ruler, because he is not tempted by any form of reward 
he could receive in exchange for his service and loyalty.
It is noteworthy that, in the Mengzi, Yang Zhu is constantly mentioned together 
with Mo Di. The central position of the two thinkers within Mencius’s philosoph-
ical world is evident by his (probably unprecedented) use of the Yang-Mo sym-
bol,15 which indicates the leading figures associated with the two main trends of 
thought, which, by taking radical and antithetical positions are considered re-
sponsible for social disorder and moral decay.
14 Han Feizi 50.04:01; here, and in all other instance of passages quoted from the Han Feizi 
below the translation is Christoph Harbsmeier’s as found in the Thesaurus Linguae Sericae 
(http://tls.uni-hd.de/procSearch/procSearchTxt.lasso, 2014/07/22)
15 The Mengzi records four occurrences of “Yang Mo”. See Mengzi 3B/9, 7B/26.
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While keeping their specific roles separated, Yang Zhu and Mo Di are thus 
combined within an expression which would later be used very frequently in Chi-
nese philosophical literature to refer to the enemies of both Mencius and the Ru.
1.1  Teng wen Gong  滕文公 II ( Mengzi 3B/14)
The most devastating and influential criticism of Mozi and Yang Zhu is recorded 
in the chapter Teng wen Gong 滕文公 II, where the criticism presented was even-
tually form the core of the attitude of orthodox Neo-Confucianism with regard to 
both thinkers. Mencius, in this passage, presents an overview of history down to 
his own times in the form of a cyclical theory of alternating phases of order and 
disorder ( yi zhi yi luan 一治一亂) that can be summarized as follows:
Exordium: The aim of the message, which uses refined rhetorical devices, is 
partially revealed in the incipit: the power of language as a political 
and moral instrument. Mencius, by means of an ill-concealed at-
tempt at “making a virtue out of necessity”,16 already lays the basis 
for his own plan of action that, in a sense, follows the principle of 
zheng ming 正名 “rectification of names”. In fact, by imitating Con-
fucius (551–479 B.C.) who completed the Chunqiu 春秋 (Spring and 
Autumn) and, through his words, “rebellious ministers and villain-
ous sons were struck with terror (luan chen ze zi ju 亂臣賊子懼)”, 
Mencius is struggling for order not as a ruler resorting to political 
action, but as a scholar, who is trying to establishing order through 
his words.
Disorder I: The original chaos of the world.
Order I: Yao 堯, Shun 舜 and Yu 禹 created order out of disorder through 
feats of engineering.
Disorder II:  Depraved rulers, such as Jie 桀 and Zhou 紂, brought disorder 
through their misconduct.
Order II: King Wen 文, King Wu 武, and the Duke of Zhou (Zhou Gong 周公) 
restored order by slaying the evil rulers of the Shang 商, re-estab-
lishing political institutions and driving away the wild beasts.
Disorder III: Evil ministers and disloyal sons brought the world into a state of 
disorder and Yang Zhu and Mo Di’s teachings appeared.
Epilogue 
16 “Me, being fond of disputing?! ( yu qi hao bian zai 予豈好辯哉)”, said Mencius in two occa-
sions. See Mengzi 3B/14.
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Exordium
公都子曰：「外人皆稱夫子好辯，敢問何也？」
Gong Duzi asked Mencius: “The people beyond our lineage all speak of you as 
being fond of disputing. I venture to ask whether it be so.”
孟子曰：「予豈好辯哉？予不得已也。天下之生久矣，一治一亂。
Mencius replied: “Me, being fond of disputing? I am compelled to do it! A long 
time has elapsed since this world of men received its being, and there has been 
throughout its history a period of good order, and now a period of confusion.”
Disorder I – Order I
當堯之時，水逆行，氾濫於中國。蛇龍居之，民無所定。下者為巢，上者為營窟。
《書》曰：『洚水警余。』洚水者，洪水也。使禹治之，禹掘地而注之海，驅蛇
龍而放之菹。水由地中行，江、淮、河、漢是也。險阻既遠，鳥獸之害人者消，
然後人得平土而居之。
In the time of Yao, the waters, flowing out of their channels, inundated the Middle 
Kingdom. Snakes and dragons occupied it, and the people had no place where 
they could settle themselves. In the low grounds they made nests for themselves 
on the trees or raised platforms, and in the high grounds they made caves. It is 
said in the Book of Documents: ‘The waters in their wild course warned me.’ Those 
‘waters in their wild course’ were the waters of the great inundation. Shun em-
ployed Yu to reduce the waters to order. Yu dug open their obstructed channels, 
and conducted them to the sea. He drove away the snakes and dragons, and 
forced them into the grassy marshes. At this, the waters pursued their course 
through the country, even the waters of the Jiang, the Huai, the He, and the Han, 
and the dangers and obstructions which they had occasioned were removed. The 
birds and beasts which had injured the people also disappeared, and after this 
humans found the plains available for them, and occupied them.
Disorder II
「堯、舜既沒，聖人之道衰。暴君代作，壞宮室以為汙池，民無所安息；棄田
以為園囿，使民不得衣食。邪說暴行又作，園囿、汙池、沛澤多而禽獸至。及
紂之身，天下又大亂。
After the death of Yao and Shun, the principles that mark sages fell into decay. 
Oppressive sovereigns arose one after another, who pulled down houses to make 
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ponds and lakes, so that the people knew not where they could rest in quiet; they 
threw fields out of cultivation to form gardens and parks, so that the people could 
not get clothes and food. Afterwards, corrupt speakings and oppressive deeds 
became more rife; gardens and parks, ponds and lakes, thickets and marshes 
became more numerous, and birds and beasts swarmed. By the time of the tyrant 
Zhou, the kingdom was again in a state of great confusion.
Order II
周公相武王，誅紂伐奄，三年討其君，驅飛廉於海隅而戮之。滅國者五十，驅虎、
豹、犀、象而遠之。天下大悅。《書》曰：『丕顯哉，文王謨！丕承哉，武王烈！
佑啟我後人，咸以正無缺。』
Zhou Gong assisted king Wu, and destroyed Zhou. He smote Yan, and after three 
years put its sovereign to death. He drove Fei Lian to a corner by the sea, and slew 
him. The States which he extinguished amounted to fifty. He drove far away also 
the tigers, leopards, rhinoceroses, and elephants – and all the people was greatly 
delighted. It is said in the Book of Documents: ‘Great and splendid were the plans 
of king Wen! Greatly were they carried out by the energy of king Wu! They are for 
the assistance and instruction of us who are of an after day. They are all in princi-
ple correct, and deficient in nothing’.
Disorder III
世衰道微，邪說暴行有作，臣弒其君者有之，子弒其父者有之。孔子懼，作《春
秋》。《春秋》，天子之事也。是故孔子曰：『知我者其惟春秋乎！罪我者其
惟春秋乎！』
Again the world fell into decay, and principles faded away. Perverse speakings 
and oppressive deeds waxed rife again. There were instances of ministers who 
murdered their sovereigns, and of sons who murdered their fathers. Confucius 
was afraid, and made the Spring and Autumn. What the Spring and Autumn con-
tains are matters proper to the sovereign. On this account Confucius said: ‘It is the 
Spring and Autumn which will make men know me, and it is the Spring and 
Autumn which will make men condemn me’.
「聖王不作，諸侯放恣，處士橫議，楊朱、墨翟之言盈天下。天下之言，不歸
楊，則歸墨。楊氏為我，是無君也；墨氏兼愛，是無父也。無父無君，是禽獸
也。公明儀曰：『庖有肥肉，廄有肥馬，民有飢色，野有餓莩，此率獸而食人
也。』楊墨之道不息，孔子之道不著，是邪說誣民，充塞仁義也。仁義充塞，
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則率獸食人，人將相食。吾為此懼，閑先聖之道，距楊墨，放淫辭，邪說者不
得作。作於其心，害於其事；作於其事，害於其政。聖人復起，不易吾言矣。
Sage sovereigns cease to arise, and the princes of the States give the reins to their 
lusts. Unemployed scholars indulge in unreasonable discussions. The doctrines 
of Yang Zhu and Mo Di fill the world. All doctrines in the world that do not tend 
towards Yang tend toward Mo. Now, Yang’s principle is ‘each one for himself’, 
which does not acknowledge the authority of the sovereign. Mo’s principle is ‘to 
care equally for all’, which does not acknowledge the peculiar affection due to a 
father. But to acknowledge neither king nor father is to be in the state of the 
beasts! Gong Meng Yi said: ‘In their kitchens, there is fat meat. In their stables, 
there are fat horses. But their people have the look of hunger, and on the wilds 
there are those who have died of famine. This is leading on beasts to devour men’. 
If the principles of Yang and Mo be not stopped, and the principles of Confucius 
not set forth, then those perverse speakings will delude the people, and stop up 
the path of goodness and rightness. When goodness and rightness are stopped 
up, beasts will be led on to devour men, and men will devour one another. I am 
alarmed by these things, and address myself to the defense of the principles of 
the Former Sages, and to oppose Yang and Mo. I drive away their licentious ex-
pressions, so that such perverse speakers may not be able to show themselves. 
Their delusions spring up in men’s heart/mind, and do injury to their practice of 
affairs. Shown in their practice of affairs, they are pernicious to their government. 
When sages shall rise up again, they will not change my words.
Epilogue
昔者禹抑洪水而天下平，周公兼夷狄驅猛獸而百姓寧，孔子成《春秋》而亂臣
賊子懼。《詩》云：『戎狄是膺，荊舒是懲，則莫我敢承。』無父無君，是周
公所膺也。我亦欲正人心，息邪說，距詖行，放淫辭，以承三聖者；豈好辯
哉？予不得已也。能言距楊墨者，聖人之徒也。
In former times, Yu repressed the vast waters of the inundation, and the country 
was reduced to order. Zhou Gong’s achievements extended even to the barbarous 
tribes of the east and north, and he drove away all ferocious animals, and the 
people enjoyed repose. Confucius completed the Spring and Autumn, and rebel-
lious ministers and villainous sons were struck with terror. It is said in the Book of 
Odes: ‘He smote the barbarians of the west and the north; He punished Jing and 
Shu; and no one dared to resist us.’ These father-deniers and king-deniers would 
have been smitten by Zhou Goestng. I also wish to rectify men’s heart/mind, and 
to put an end to those perverse doctrines, to oppose their one-sided actions and 
banish away their licentious expressions – and thus to carry on the work of the 
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Three Sages. Do I do so because I am fond of disputing? I am compelled to do it. 
Whoever is able to oppose Yang and Mo is a disciple of the sages.17
The epilogue could also be divided into the following stages: 
昔者禹抑洪水而天下平
In former times, Yu repressed the vast waters of the inundation, and the country was re-
duced to order
周公兼夷狄驅猛獸而百姓寧
Zhou Gong’s achievements extended even to the barbarous tribes of the east and north, and 
he drove away all ferocious animals, and the people enjoyed repose
孔子成《春秋》而亂臣賊子懼。《詩》云：『戎狄是膺，荊舒是懲，則莫我敢承。』
Confucius completed the Spring and Autumn, and rebellious ministers and villainous sons 
were struck with terror. It is said in the Book of Odes: ‘He smote the barbarians of the west 
and the north; he punished Jing and Shu; and no one dared to resist us.’
In the above passages, the excellence of the Three Sages (those who will be later 
defined by Mencius as san shengzhe 三聖者) is highlighted: Yu, Zhou Gong, and 
Confucius, i.e. three models of wisdom that, in different ways, brought order into 
the world.
The conclusion follows this structure:
無父無君，是周公所膺也。
These father-deniers and king-deniers would have been smitten by Zhou Gong.
我亦欲正人心，息邪說，距詖行，放淫辭，以承三聖者。
I also wish to rectify men’s heart/mind, and to put an end to those perverse doctrines, to 
oppose their one-sided actions and banish away their licentious expressions – and thus to 
carry on the work of the three sages. [Explicit declaration of intents of the rhetorical 
message]
豈好辯哉？予不得已也。
Do I do so because I am fond of disputing? I am compelled to do it. [Reiteration of the incipit 
for emphatic purposes; recapitulation with a strong emotional appeal]
能言距楊墨者，聖人之徒也。
Whoever is able to oppose Yang and Mo is a disciple of the sages.
All in all, the dispositio of the whole section – from the beginning to the develop-
ment of the central theme, which is then repeated in the conclusion – follows a 
17 Mengzi 3B/14, transl. Legge 1895: 278–284, transl. mod. auct.
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chronological order that provides nonetheless for a cyclical pattern of phases of 
order and disorder. We also see an example of prolepsis in the evocation of a state 
of affairs that has not yet occurred. Yang and Mo’s behaviors and, above all, the 
spread of their ideas, are the beginning of a dramatic chain of events that ends up 
by having “men devour each other”. Of course, the dramatic perspective created 
by means of the prolepsis is emphasized through an extreme scenario, high-
lighted by hyperboles.
We could also recognize an “Homeric” or “Nestorian” rhetorical scheme18 in 
the light of the contents of the exordium and epilogue, as the strong argument lies 
in insisting that Mencius is not fond of disputation but he is compelled to do it in 
order to fight Yang and Mo through his words and act as a true disciple of the 
sages.
Also worth mentioning are some rhetorical devices used at the beginning of 
the section, which starts with the rhetorical question by the disciple Gong Duzi, 
who asks Mencius how it could be that outside the Ru lineage Mencius himself is 
identified as “being fond of disputing” (hao bian 好辯). It is a question asked 
more to produce an effect than to summon an answer. In this case, the question 
shows that there is complicity between Gong Duzi 公都子 and Mencius, to such 
an extent that the answer is obvious, thus revealing that the question itself has 
a different rhetorical function, as we will see later. This question, in fact, gives 
Mencius the opportunity to define his own position while developing an articu-
lated and complex argument making use of bian 辯 (“disputing” or “distinction 
drawing”), a form of dialectical persuasion and activity aimed fundamentally 
at “distinguishing” and classifying the relations between words (ming 名) and 
actualities (shi 實). Although Mencius wants to distance himself from the so 
called bianzhe 辯者 – “disputers” or “dialecticians” – because he probably wants 
to stress that his main goal is not simply to enjoy “disputation” per se, it is hard 
to deny that he was radically different from those “disputers” who flourished 
throughout pre-Qin era as wandering political advisors and counselors.
The strategy adopted by Mencius to define his own position is, from the be-
ginning, marked by the use of rhetorical figures: he uses an anthypophora, i.e. the 
practice of asking oneself a question and then immediately answering it, a rhetor-
ical figure in which the arguments of our antagonist are anticipated and refuted. 
Anthypophora is also assimilated to a rhetorical tactic of refuting an objection 
with a contrary inference or allegation. Mencius’ point is that he is not fond of 
disputation; he has no choice, he is forced to engage in disputations with his 
18 The “Homeric” or “Nestorian” order puts the best argument at the beginning and at the end 
of the discussion. See Cornificius 1969: III, 10, 18; see also Mortara Garavelli 1989: 105.
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rivals. Nevertheless, he maintains that the dialectical instrument is functional to 
his mission. He does not deny engaging in bian, yet he legitimates a practice that 
some consider a mere exercise of sterile rhetoric. Mencius, therefore, wants to 
ennoble an activity which is not always commendable by exalting the purposes 
for which it is carried out. We should not forget the starting point of the theoreti-
cal structure of paragraph 3B/14: the urgency to legitimize a practice not always 
unobjectionable when faced with the pressing needs of the historical context. 
The arguments are developed extensively throughout the whole section and the 
arrangement of the speech is complex and stratified. Therefore, it is no coinci-
dence that the centrality of the subject-matter of the question by Gong Duzi and 
the answer by Mencius is confirmed by the reiteration in the closing paragraph: 
the pericope used as incipit is repeated verbatim, (qi hai bian zai? Yu bu de yi ye. 
豈好辯哉? 予不得已也。). Thus, Mencius, before ending his argument, stresses 
that what he has explained up to that moment is aimed at clarifying his position, 
thus emphasizing the point that he is not disputing because he is fond of dispu-
tation, but because he is compelled to do it.
Moreover, by the reiteration of the incipit, the texts reinforce the main point 
of Mencius’s argument: it is through “words” ( yan 言) that is possible to “fend 
off” ( ju 距) Yang and Mo and be, thereby, a disciple of the sages. We can now 
point out some features in the rhetorical use of the Yang-Mo category, which in-
cludes all followers of non-Ru theories, by categorizing the range of ethical devi-
ance into two dichotomous positions and placing them at the extremes of a moral 
and ideological scheme in which the Ru are located right in the middle. In the 
passage that we will be examining below, the image of Mencius holding to the 
center-ground, which would become a paradigm and a point of reference for the 
future generations of Ru, will be demonstrated even more clearly, especially with 
reference to the term zhong 中 “mean, center”. Deviances are classified either as 
Yang-oriented or as Mo-oriented. The “compression” of the plurality of positions 
into the category Yang-Mo is, of course, extremely useful from a strategic point of 
view; it makes the target of Mencius’s critique more easily detectable. In some 
ways, we might even define it as a common rhetorical devise: the synecdoche, 
since the expression Yang-Mo is used to refer to all non-Ru systems of thought. 
There is a gradual crystallization of the wu jun and wu fu categories as criteria of 
identification of both individual instances of deviance (the Yang and the Mo) and 
of deviances in a broader sense. The two terms wu jun and wu fu are gradually 
exchanged: the first one with Yang and wei wo; the second with Mo and jian ai 
兼愛 “to care equally for all”. This process is completed in the final part of the 
text, when we read that “these father-deniers and king-deniers would have been 
smitten by Zhou Gong.” The use of the term ying 膺 “to smite, attack; to resist, to 
oppose” appears to be a military metaphor: Mencius’s action is similar to Zhou 
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Gong’s 周公, when opposing – this time using words and not weapons – the 
spread of Yang’s and Mo’s doctrines. In combating the words of Yang and Mo, he 
was doing as the Duke of Zhou would have done, hoping to carry on the work of 
the Three Sages.
Clearly, Mencius felt that both Yang and Mo were threats: one to the order of 
the state, the other to the family. Nevertheless, we may assume that the emphasis 
of the Mohists on making no distinctions in their care for others (ai wu cha deng 
愛無差等,19 jian ai) appeared to be the more basic threat, because a class struc-
tured society whose advanced stage of civilization was due to a division of labor 
could not have existed without inequalities. Although less emphatically than 
Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 310–215 B.C.),20 Mencius considered class inequality to be a nec-
essary condition for the division of labor that had enabled the Zhou 周 to reach a 
high degree of culture and civilization in comparison to the nomads and the 
neighboring populations.21 Mark E. Lewis notes how, in early China, the flood 
was associated not only with the necessity of controlling raging water, but mostly 
with “all the criminality, bad government, and intellectual deviance that threat-
ened the social order.”22 The Mengzi’s accounts of the taming of the flood in an-
cient times are therefore rhetorical tools used to stress the danger of abandoning 
the political principles rooted in the social division of labor and in the distinction 
between the ruler and the subjects. The flood is a metaphor standing for the col-
lapse of the social system of regulations and distinctions that Mencius was trying 
to save from Yang’s and Mo’s attempts to eliminate the ruler (i.e. the state) and the 
father (i.e. the family).
Nevertheless, it is only partially true that Mo Di’s doctrines would have 
threatened only family stability; actually, the inauspicious social implications of 
the Mohist theories were just as dramatic.
1.2  Jin xin  I 盡心上 ( Mengzi 7A/26)
The harshness of the confrontation between Mencius and the Yang Zhu’s and Mo 
Di’s theories is made explicit in the following passage, one of the most famous in 
Chinese classical literature:
19 See Mengzi 2A/5.
20 See Xunzi 70/19/1,75/19/103.
21 See Mengzi 3A/4. See also Lyell 1962: 14.
22 Lewis 2006: 53 (see the whole chapter two “Flood Taming and Criminality”: 49–77). See also 
Teiser 1985–1986.
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孟子曰：「楊子取為我，拔一毛而利天下，不為也。墨子兼愛，摩頂放踵利天下，為之。
子莫執中，執中為近之，執中無權，猶執一也。所惡執一者，為其賊道也，舉一而廢百
也。」
Mencius said: “The principle of Master Yang is ‘each one for himself’ (wei wo 為我). Though 
he might have benefited the whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not have 
done it. Master Mo cares equally for all ( jian ai 兼愛). If by rubbing smooth his whole body 
from the crown to the heel, he could have benefited the world, he would have done it. Zi Mo 
holds a medium between these (Zi Mo zhi zhong 子莫執中). By holding that medium, he is 
nearer the right. But by holding it without leaving room for an evaluation according to the 
circumstances (zhi zhong wu quan 執中無權), it becomes like they’re holding their one 
point. The reason why I hate that holding to one point is the injury it does to the way of right 
principle. It takes up one point and disregards a hundred others.”23
As observed previously, Mencius’s statements are especially significant in the 
case of Yang Zhu, since they have long been considered a faithful record of the 
core Yangist values. The image of Yang Zhu, who refuses to pluck out a single hair 
for the benefit of the world, has become, rightly or wrongly, the distinguishing 
element of his philosophical message. However, it is not clear whether this 
provocative position is an authentic Yangist principle or should be considered as 
an instructive example to clarify the level of Yang Zhu’s egoism. There is also 
disagreement on the meaning to be given to the expression li tianxia 利天下,24 
commonly translated – at least in this passage – as “to benefit the world”. Carine 
Defoort argues that “Yangist discourse in li concerns not ‘the world’ but the integ-
rity and preservation of one’s body”:25 it would be misleading to represent the 
Yangism as a movement that dealt with li 利 “benefit” in terms similar to that of 
the Mohists and Mencius “transpose[d] […] Yangist themes into a Mohist mode”.26
Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895–1990) has pointed out that
Professor Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 holds that the account in Mencius of Yang Zhu, that “though he 
might have benefited the world … he would not have done it”, should be interpreted as 
meaning: “Though he might have been benefited by having the world … he would be unwill-
ing.” The conciseness and lack of inflection in the Chinese language makes either reading 
possible, depending on whether we take the word li 利, meaning “benefit”, to be an active 
verb (to benefit) or passive (to be benefited by). See his Cong Lüshi Chunqiu tuize Laozi zhi 
chengshu niandai 從《呂氏春秋》推測《老子》之成書年代, in Gu Shi bian 古史辨, Vol. IV, 
pp. 493–494. […] It is probable that the words: “If one would benefit him by giving him the 
whole world, and hope thus that he would pluck out one of his hairs, he would not do so”, 
represent Yang’s actual doctrine; whereas the words: “Though he might have benefited the 
23 Mengzi 7A/26, transl. Legge 1895: 464–465, transl. mod. auct.
24 See Andreini 2000: 49–63.
25 Defoort 2004: 56.
26 Defoort 2008: 173.
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whole world by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it”, are Mencius’s inter-
pretation of this doctrine.27 
The same argument was resumed by Graham as well:
It can be seen that Gu Jiegang was right in arguing that Mencius misrepresented Yang Zhu. 
It was not that the Yangist would not lift a finger to help the world; the point was that he 
would not accept the least injury to the body, even the loss of a hair, for the sake of any ex-
ternal possession, even the throne of the empire. […] Why did Mencius say that Yang Zhu 
refused to give a hair to benefit the world? Gu Jiegang may have been right in suggesting that 
Yang Zhu did use the phrase li tianxia, but not in the sense of ‘benefiting the world’; Yang’s 
meaning was probably closer to ‘treating the world as a benefit [to oneself]’.28
On the meaning of li tianxia, Graham argued:
Li is translatable as ‘to benefit’ before animate objects, but ‘to use for one’s own benefit’ 
before inanimate objects. Throughout the concordanced pre-Han texts, li tianxia is ‘benefit 
the world’, with tianxia treated consistently as animate; and the accounts of Yang Zhu’s 
doctrines in Mencius (7A/26) and Lie Zi (SPTK ed., 7.4b) both enforce this interpretation by 
parallelism. Previously, therefore, I doubted the grammatical acceptability of Gu Jiegang 
proposal (Graham, “Dialogue between Yang Ju and Chyntzyy,” p. 295). But I have since no-
ticed in the Lüshi chunqiu a case of li tianxia where Gu Jiegang’s interpretation is demanded 
by the parallelism (Xu Weiyu [許維遹], Lüshi 20.3a).29
The passage from Lüshi chunqiu (“a case of li tianxia where Gu Jiegang’s inter- 
pretation is demanded by the parallelism”) that Graham refers to is the following: 
“the Son of Heaven benefited from the world (Tianzi li tianxia 天子利天下), the 
prince benefited from the state ( guo jun li guo 國君利國), the high-ranking officer 
benefited from his position ( guan zhang li guan 官長利官)”.30 
27 Feng Youlan 1952–1953: vol. 1, 134, note 2. Chinese transcriptions have been adapted to pinyin.
28 Graham 1985: 75–76. Chinese transcriptions have been adapted to pinyin. The use of the ex-
pression li tianxia with the meaning of “treating the world as a benefit” may be due to a putative 
use of the verb li. Considered as an intransitive verb, li has the meaning of “to be useful, benefi-
cial, favorable, and profitable”. When followed by a direct object, intransitive attributive verbs 
change their valency from active into causative with a putative or factitive “hue”. In the Mohist 
Canon (Mojing 墨經), li 利 “profit, advantage, usefulness” is defined as “what one is pleased to 
obtain” (li, suo de er xi ye 利，所得而喜也). See Mozi 65/40/10.
29 Graham 1985: 81–82, note 25.
30 Lüshi chunqiu 20.1/129/8. The meaning of this translation may be inferred from the context 
rather than from specific syntactic elements. Another possible interpretation is “the Son of 
Heaven benefited the world (or “helped, favored the world”), the prince benefited the state, and 
the high-ranking officer benefited his office”. It is clear that li means both “to benefit, to favor 
something” and “to benefit from something, to profit from something”. In the Lüshi chunqiu 
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Before going back to the Mengzi passage referred to at the beginning of the 
paragraph, it is necessary to try to distinguish the authentic meaning of the 
Yangist doctrine from Mencius’s interpretation, whose reliability is questionable. 
The object of the present work is to detect the specificity and, if possible, the level 
of consistency of Mencius’s interpretation of the Yangist values and, to this end, 
it is useful to link the argumentative strategy developed in the Mengzi to the ideo-
logical and narrative structure of the text itself.
Although the debate with Yang Zhu develops in response to a definite doc-
trine (i.e. wei wo), it is also true that in dealing with such a doctrine, the Mengzi 
may also address concerns remote from the Yangist philosophy. Unfortunately, at 
the moment, only hypotheses can be formulated. Therefore, it would be a mistake 
to interpret the passage ba yi mao er li tianxia bu wei ye 拔一毛而利天下不為也 
and the meaning of the character li 利 as elements that conform to an aprioristic 
definition of the Yangist doctrine. The figure of Yang Zhu was also associated with 
the principle of qing wu zhong sheng 輕物重生 “to despise material things and to 
attach utmost importance to life”; hence it is likely that he might have refused the 
benefits deriving from possessing anything, including the world. Nonetheless, 
interpreting the meaning of the expression li tianxia 利天下 in the passage ba yi 
mao er li tianxia bu wei ye as ‘to benefit, to favor the world’ still remains not only 
an acceptable option, but also the most plausible one, considering some ideolog-
ical and linguistic peculiarities of the Mengzi that will now be explored.
There is some reason to believe that the occurrences of li 利 in the parallel 
sentences ba yi mao er li tianxia and mo ding fang zhong li tianxia wei zhi 摩頂放
踵利天下為之 “if by rubbing smooth his whole body from the crown to the heel, 
he could have benefited the world, he would have done it” in section 7A/26 of 
Mengzi have the same meaning. Moreover, one would expect the verb li 利 in the 
passages being examined to mean “to benefit, to be useful to, to favor”, in accor-
dance with other occurrences of the word li 利 attested in the same text. In Mengzi 
1A/1, li 利 appears in the expressions li wu guo/jia/shen 利吾國／家／身 “to ben-
efit, to be useful to, to favor my country/family/myself”. Also in the passage li zhi 
er bu yong 利之而不庸 “when he benefits them, they do not think of his merit”, li 
利 means “to favor, benefit”.31 In contrast, the only example in Mengzi in which li 
there is also another passage where li is usually interpreted as meaning “to benefit from, to take 
advantage of”: jun dao bu fei zhe tianxia li zhi 君道不廢者天下利之 “if the Way of the sovereign 
was not abandoned, it is because the world will take advantage of it.” See Lüshi chunqiu 
20.1/128/30.
31 Mengzi 7A/13, transl. Legge 1895: 455, transl. mod. auct.
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means “to take advantage of” is an qi wei er li qi zi 安其危而利其菑 “he feels safe 
in dangerous situations, he is able to take advantage of adversities as well.”32
An examination of the occurrences of li in pre-Qin and early-Han texts shows 
that it may be interpreted both with the meaning of “to benefit someone or some-
thing, to be useful to” and “to benefit from, to take advantage of”.33 This duality 
may be noticed in the expression li tianxia as well. If, in the previously mentioned 
example taken from the Lüshi chunqiu, the sentence tianzi li tianxia 天子利天下 
should be taken to mean “the Son of Heaven considers the world useful → bene-
fits from the world”, a very similar passage in Han Feizi has a totally different 
meaning: Yu li tianxia 禹利天下 would not mean “Yu benefited from the world”, 
but rather “Yu did his utmost for the world, favored the world”,34 as the sentence 
jian li tianxia 兼利天下 in Xunzi means “favors the whole world indiscriminate-
ly”.35 More occurrences should be taken into consideration, for example the fol-
lowing passage from the Mozi:
斷指與斷腕，利於天下相若，無擇也；死生利若，一無擇也。殺一人以存天下，非殺一人
以利天下也。殺己以存天下，是殺己以利天下。於事為之中而權輕重之謂求，求為之，非
也，害之中取小，求為義非為義也。
Cutting off a finger and cutting off a hand are alike in terms of benefit to the world: there is 
no choosing. Dying and living, in terms of benefit are as one: there is no choosing. Killing 
another person to preserve the world is different from killing another person to benefit the 
world. If killing oneself might preserve the world, it is like killing oneself to benefit the 
world. With respect to the conduct of affairs, there is a weighing up of light and heavy. This 
is called “seeking”. “Seeking” is about right and wrong. In situations where the lesser harm 
is chosen, the seeking may be appropriate or inappropriate.36
32 Mengzi 4A/8, transl. Legge 1895: 298, transl. mod. auct.
33 A.C. Graham’s assumption according to which li 利 followed by an animate object means “to 
take advantage of” is not fully confirmed in pre-Qin texts. See for example section 35/10/85–88 of 
Xunzi, where li is used both with the meaning of “to benefit (someone or something)” and “to 
benefit from, to take advantage of”. In particular, the passage bu li er li zhi bu ru li er hou li zhi zhi 
li ye 不利而利之不如利而後利之之利 is translated by John Knoblock as “not benefiting the 
people yet taking benefits from them provides fewer benefits than that of benefiting from the 
people only after first having benefited them.” See Knoblock 1990: 133.
34 Han Feizi 50.11.34.
35 Xunzi 16/6/18.
36 Mozi 75/44/7–8. See Graham 1978: 250–251. See also another occurrence of li tianxia in Mozi 
77/24/52. The expression li tianxia in Zhuangzi should also be considered in the same way, i.e. 
with the meaning of “to benefit, to favour the world”. See Zhuangzi 24/10/14, 68/24/87, 86/31/6. In 
the bamboo manuscript known as Tang Yu zhi dao 唐虞之道 “The dao of Tang (Yao) and Yu 
(Shun)” found at Guodian 郭店 tomb no. 1, the expression li tianxia appears several times, as in 
li tianxia er fu li ye, ren zhi zhi ye 利天下而弗利也，忎(仁)之之(致)也 “to profit the world rather 
than to profit the self is the height of humanity” (cf. Cook 2012, vol 1: 545, 548). This sentence 
seems to confirm that, in its transitive use, the verb li 利 has both exo- and endoactive meanings 
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With an eye to the major pre-Qin sources and by virtue of the balance of evidence 
in the Mengzi, the appropriate translation of the passage ba yi mao er li tianxia bu 
wei ye should be “he would refuse to pluck out a single hair to the benefit of the 
world, for the sake of the world’s common good” instead of “he would refuse to 
pluck out a single hair to enjoy the benefits of possessing the world”, although 
this second interpretation probably better expresses an authentic Yangist doc-
trine. But might it perhaps be possible that this issue of “offering or refusing to 
pluck out hairs of one’s body”, traditionally associated with Yang and Mo, actu-
ally has neither a Yangist nor a Mohist origin? It should be noticed that the refusal 
to damage even the most insignificant part of one’s body as a sign of respect to-
wards oneself is present also in Mengzi 2A/2:
曰：「有。北宮黝之養勇也，不膚撓，不目逃，思以一豪挫於人，若撻之於市朝。不受於
褐寬博，亦不受於萬乘之君。視刺萬乘之君，若刺褐夫。無嚴諸侯。惡聲至，必反之。孟
施舍之所養勇也，曰：『視不勝猶勝也。量敵而後進，慮勝而後會，是畏三軍者也。舍豈
能為必勝哉？能無懼而已矣。』孟施舍似曾子，北宮黝似子夏。夫二子之勇，未知其孰賢，
然而孟施舍守約也。昔者曾子謂子襄曰：『子好勇乎？吾嘗聞大勇於夫子矣：自反而不縮，
雖褐寬博，吾不惴焉；自反而縮，雖千萬人，吾往矣。』孟施舍之守氣，又不如曾子之守
約也。」
“Yes”, was the answer. “Bei Gong You had this way of nourishing his valour: he did not 
flinch from any strokes at his body. He did not turn his eyes aside from any thrusts at them. 
He considered that the slightest push from any one was the same as if he were beaten before 
the crowds in the market-place, and that what he would not receive from a common man in 
his loose, large garments of hair, neither should he receive from a prince of ten thousand 
chariots. He viewed stabbing a prince of ten thousand chariots just as stabbing a fellow 
dressed in cloth of hair. He feared not any of all the princes. A bad word addressed to him 
would be always returned. Meng Shi She had this way of nourishing his valour: he said: ‘I 
look upon not conquering and conquering in the same way. To measure the enemy and then 
advance; to calculate the chances of victory and then engage – this is to stand in awe of the 
opposing force. How can I make certain of conquering? I can only rise superior to all fear’. 
Meng Shi She resembled Master Zeng. Bei Gong You resembled Zi Xia. I do not know to 
the valour of which of the two the superiority should be ascribed, but yet Meng Shi She 
attended to what was of the greater importance. Formerly, Master Zeng said to Zi Xiang: 
“Do you love valour? I heard an account of great valour from the Master. It speaks thus: ‘If, 
on self-examination, I find that I am not upright, shall I not be in fear even of a poor man in 
his loose garments of hair-cloth? If, on self-examination, I find that I am upright, I will go 
forward against thousands and tens of thousands’. Yet, what Meng Shi She maintained, 
of “to favor, to benefit” and “to benefit from”. I say “transitive use” because in the first case the 
object of the verb li 利 is tianxia, while in the second case it is “blended” in fu 弗 (OC *pə-t), 
probably a fusion of bu 不 (*pə) and the object pronoun zhi 之 (*tə). Jingmen shi bowuguan 荊門
市博物館 (ed.) 1988: 157–158.
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being merely his physical energy, was after all inferior to what Master Zeng maintained, 
which was indeed of the most importance.”37
A.C. Graham suggested that the refusal to endanger one’s life by taking on gov-
ernment tasks, either for a social cause or for the personal benefits of wealth and 
fame, represents the most typical feature of Yangist thought:
For moralists such as the Confucians and Mohists, to refuse a throne would not be a proof 
of high-minded indifference to personal gain, but a selfish rejection of the opportunity to 
benefit the people. They therefore derided Yang Zhu as a man who would not sacrifice a hair 
even to benefit the whole world.38
As has already been remarked, it is very likely that Mengzi is the most ancient 
source that contrasts Yang Zhu’s refusal to sacrifice a single hair for the sake of 
the world’s common good and Mozi’s will to shave from head to foot. In the case 
of Yang Zhu, however, the topos might not be a reflection of the original Yangist 
doctrine. This issue, with slight, yet significant, variations, is dealt with in two 
more texts which were presumably compiled later than the Mengzi: indirectly, 
without mentioning Yang Zhu, in the passage 50.4.4 in Han Feizi that was pre- 
viously translated and, more extensively, in the Yang Zhu chapter of Liezi:
楊朱曰：「伯成子高不以一毫利物，舍國而隱耕。大禹不以一身自利，一體偏枯。古之人，
損一毫利天下，不與也，悉天下奉一身，不取也。人人有損一毫，人人不利天下，天下治
矣。」
禽子問楊朱曰：「去子體之一毛，以濟一世，不汝為之乎？」楊子曰：「世因非一毛之所濟。」
禽子曰：「假濟，為之乎？」楊子弗應。
禽子出，語孟孫陽。孟孫陽曰：「子不達夫子之心，吾請言之。有侵苦肌膚獲萬金者，若
為之夫？」曰：「為之。」 孟孫陽曰：「有斷若一節得一國。子為之乎？」
禽子默然有間。 孟孫陽曰：「一毛微于肌膚，肌膚微于一節，省矣。然則積一毛以成肌膚，
積肌膚以成一節。一毛固一體萬分中之一物，奈何輕之乎？」
禽子曰：「吾不能所以答子。然則以子之言問者聃、關尹，則子言當矣；以吾言問大禹、
墨翟，則吾言當矣。」孟孫陽因顧與其徒說他事。
Yang Zhu said: “Bocheng Zigao would not benefit others (or “refuse to get any benefit by 
acquiring possessions of outer things”?) at the cost of one hair; he renounced his state and 
retired to plough the fields. Yu the Great did not keep even his body for his own benefit and 
one side of him was paralyzed (because he worked to drain the flood). There was a man of 
ancient times, who, if he could have benefited the world by the loss of one hair, would not 
have given it; and if everything in the world had been offered to him alone, would not have 
37 Mengzi 2A/2, transl. Legge 1895: 186–188, transl. mod. auct.
38 Graham 1960: 135–136.
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taken it. When not one man would not lose a hair, and no one man would not benefit the 
empire, the world was in good order.” 
Qinzi (Qin Guli) asked Yang Zhu: “If you could help the whole world by sacrificing one hair 
of your body, would you not do it?”
“The world certainly will not be relieved by one hair.”
“But supposing it did help, would you do it?”
Yang Zhu didn’t want to answer him.
When Qin Guli came out he told Mengsun Yang, who said: “You do not understand what is 
in my Master’s mind. Let me explain. If you could win ten thousand pieces of gold by injur-
ing your skin and flesh, would you do it?”
“I would.”
“If you could gain a kingdom by cutting off one limb at the joint, would you do it?”
Qin Guli was silent for a while. Mengsun Yang continued: “It is clear that one hair is a trifle 
compared with skin and flesh, and skin and flesh compared with one joint. [That is perfectly 
clear.] However, enough hairs are worth as much as skin and flesh, enough skin and flesh as 
much as one joint. You cannot deny that one hair has its place among the myriad parts of 
the body; how can one treat it lightly?”
Qin Guli said: “I do not know how to answer you. I can only say that if you were to question 
Laozi and Guan Yin about your opinion they would agree with you, and if I were to question 
– Yu the Great and Mozi about mine they would agree with me.”
Mengsun Yang thereupon turned to his disciples and changed the subject.39
The three versions of the story recorded in the Han Feizi, the Liezi, and the Mengzi 
might reflect different interpretations of a principle which was originally Yangist; 
the first two texts seem to refer to it in a more faithful way than the latter, as con-
firmed by D.C. Lau:
Mencius is certainly guilty of misrepresentation. This is not quite the point of Yang Zhu’s 
egoism. […] Hence in Yang Zhu’s view one should not give even one hair on one’s body in 
exchange for the possession of the Empire. […] and the possession of the Empire will almost 
certainly lead to over-indulgence in one’s appetites. It is true that if one refuses to give one 
hair in exchange for the possession of the Empire, a fortiori one would refuse to give a hair 
to benefit the Empire. Mencius’ misrepresentation lies in taking what, properly speaking, is 
only a corollary and presenting it as the basic tenet of Yang Zhu’s teaching.40
We should also consider the possibility that the editors of the Mengzi associated 
the name of Yang Zhu with pre-existent material, and thus that the sentence ba yi 
mao er li tianxia bu wei ye might in no way reflect philosophical content of a 
Yangist heritage. Mencius may have taken inspiration from the legend celebrat-
39 Liezi 7/41/18.
40 Lau D.C. 1970: 30.
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ing the altruistic Yu 禹, patron of the Mohists and alleged founder of the Xia 夏 
dynasty, who – the legend goes – lost his leg hair and became lame during the 
works to tame the raging waters. The stories in the Han Feizi and in the Liezi may 
somehow better represent the efficient adaptation of the legend of Yu to the doc-
trine of Yang Zhu as expressed in Mengzi. As John Emerson stated
[…] even his [Yang Zhu] supposed refusal to sacrifice a hair from his leg to benefit the empire 
can be seen to be a transformation of a legend about the altruistic cultural hero Yu, who 
labored so diligently for the public good that he wore all the hairs from his thighs. Our ver-
sion of Yang’s refusal comes from hostile sources, but with the help of variants of the Yu 
legend we can guess at the original Yangist story: in many versions of the legend of Yu, Yu 
not only wore the hairs from his legs but also made himself lame, and in all versions he went 
for several years without seeing his family. The Yangist version of the story must have con-
trasted the good family man Yang Zhu to the masochistic, inhuman altruist Yu (representing 
the Mohists).41
Emerson’s interpretation must be taken into consideration: Yang Zhu’s refusal 
may imply a re-elaboration of the legend of Yu. Nonetheless this would not 
demonstrate that the Yangist version of the story – should a “Yangist” version 
have ever existed – “must have contrasted the good family man Yang Zhu to the 
masochistic, inhuman altruist Yu (representing the Mohists).”
There is no evidence that Yang Zhu criticizes Yu only for the fact that he spent 
eight long years working hard, without the pleasure of a family life.42 It is much 
more likely, instead, that the Yangists denounced how Yu, because of his zeal, 
had sacrificed himself in vain for the world’s sake. It is appropriate to consider 
these elements in light of the relationship between the holy inviolability of the 
self and the deceitful and superfluous utility of material goods (wu 物) and fame 
(ming 名). The statements in the Liezi and in the Han Feizi suggest that Yang Zhu 
probably conceived sacrificing a part of the body in exchange for material goods 
– even were they to be the whole world – as an iniquitous deed, harmful to one-
self. We cannot however exclude the possibility that Yang Zhu regarded any form 
of altruistic deed as insufficient to achieve the common good. In his opinion, it 
seems, order among human beings cannot proceed from actions which are inten-
tionally performed in favor of others, but only from the respect that each person 
should demonstrate to him/herself and his/her life.
Even if Yu is the patron of the Mohists, neither the Lunyu 論語 nor the Mengzi 
show hostility towards him, to the extent that both works present him to be an 
41 Emerson 1996: 549.
42 See Mengzi 3A/4, 3B/9, 4B/26, 4B/29.
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example of the highest sense of duty.43 To continue with speculation Mencius 
structured his criticism against Yang Zhu and Mo Di such that it begins already 
with a legend whose main character is the founder of the Xia dynasty, an estab-
lished example of devotion towards others. Mencius wished to highlight how 
Mozi, by observing the jian ai principle, would have been induced to sacrifice 
himself unconditionally for the sake of the world’s common good, while Yang 
Zhu, to remain faithful to his own egoism, would not “lift a finger”. Hence, the 
topos of the “hair” offered to rescue the world was used by Mencius as a criterion 
to measure Mo Di’s altruism and Yang Zhu’s egoism.
Many sources make us believe that the authors of the Mengzi drew inspira-
tion from the legend that has Yu as a protagonist, narrated in a number of works, 
among which the Han Feizi:
禹之王天下也，身執耒臿以為民先，股無胈， 脛不生毛。 雖臣虜之勞，不苦於此矣。
When Yu was king of the world he personally held the plough and the rammer to lead the 
people,44 on his thighs there was no hair, on his shins no hair grew. Even the toil of a slave 
prisoner was no more bitter than this.45
The “Zai you” 在宥 chapter of the Zhuangzi has a similar passage, which, how-
ever, does not refer to Yu, but to Yao and Shun:
昔者黃帝始以仁義 攖人之心，堯舜於是乎股无胈，脛无毛以養天下之形，愁其五藏以為
仁義，矜其血氣以規法度。
Long ago, the Yellow Emperor disturbed the minds of men with humaneness and righteous-
ness. Consequently, Yao and Shun worked themselves to the bone, till there was not a hair 
left on their legs, toiling to nourish the bodies of all under heaven. They tormented their five 
viscera with the exercise of humaneness and righteousness; they depleted blood and vital 
breath to set up laws and regulations, but still there were some who would not submit.46
In stressing the relationship between Yu and the Mohists, the “Tianxia” 天下 
chapter of the Zhuangzi is not too far from what is stated in the Han Feizi:
墨子稱道曰：昔禹之湮洪水，決江河而通四夷九州也，名川三百，支川三千，小者无數。
禹親自操耜而九雜天下之川；腓无胈，脛无毛 . 墨翟禽滑釐之意則是，其行則非也。 將使
後世之墨者，必自苦以腓无胈脛无毛相進而已矣。亂之上也，治之下也。雖然，墨子真天
下之好也，將求之不得也，雖枯槁不舍也。才士也夫 ! 
43 See Lunyu 8/18, 8/21, 14/5; Mengzi 3A/4, 4B/20, 4B/26, 4B/29, 5A/6, 6B/11.
44 See the parallelism in Huainanzi 21/7a.
45 Han Feizi 49.3.10.
46 Zhuangzi 26/11/20, transl. Mair 1994: 93, transl. mod. auct.
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Mozi defends his teachings by saying that in ancient times, when Yu dammed the flood 
waters and opened up the courses of the Yangtze and the Yellow River so that they flowed 
through the lands of the four barbarians and the nine provinces, joining with the three 
hundred famous rivers, their three thousand tributaries, and the little streams too numer-
ous to count – at that time Yu in person carried the basket and wielded the spade, gathering 
together and mingling the rivers of the world, till there was no hair down left on his calves, 
no hair on his shins; Mo Di and Qin Guli were all right in their ideas but wrong in their prac-
tices, with the result that the Mohists of later ages have felt obliged to subject themselves to 
hardship “till there is no hair down left on their calves, no hair on their shins” – their only 
thought being to outdo one another. Such efforts represent the height of confusion and the 
lowest degree of order. Nevertheless, Mozi was one who had a true love for the world. He 
failed to achieve all that he aimed for, yet, wasted and worn with exhaustion, he never 
ceased trying. He was indeed a gentleman of ability!47
According to Wang Shumin 王叔岷 (1914–2008)48, the author(s) of the Han Feizi 
relied neither upon the “Tianxia” chapter nor upon the “Zai you” chapter, but on 
another lost fragment from the Zhuangzi which was luckily preserved in a com-
mentary to the Wen xuan 文選49 (Selections of Refined Literature, 6th century) and 
in the Taiping Yulan 太平御覽50 (Imperial Overview from the Taiping Reign, 10th 
century):
莊子曰：「兩袒女浣於白水之上，禹過之而趨，曰：『治天下奈何？』女曰：『股無胈，
脛不生毛，顏色烈凍，手足胼胝，何以至是也？』」
The Zhuangzi says: “Two unclothed women were bathing in crystal clear water when Yu, 
passing by in a hurry, asked them how it would be to rule the world. The women answered: 
Until there is no down left on the calves, no hair on the shins – cope with the cold and the 
heat, calluses on hands and feet: how can one get to this point?”
In order to better understand the implications of Yang Zhu’s refusal to sacrifice 
one hair for the world, it is necessary to place this anecdote within the context of 
the wider debate on the question of sacrificing parts of the body – and, in some 
extreme cases, even sacrifice one’s life – to keep one’s morality (yi 義 “justice, 
sense of what is right, righteousness, moral appropriateness”) intact or to achieve 
personal profit (li 利). All the main lineages of thought in early China debated this 
topic, recognizing, almost unanimously, the priority of yi over the preservation of 
physical integrity.51 This specific topic is associated in the Mojing with the argu-
47 Zhuangzi 91/33/26–31.
48 Wang Shumin 1998: 239–240.
49 Wen xuan Li Shan zhu 文選李善注 (1965), j. 40, “Sima Changqing ‘Nanshu fulao’ zhu” 司馬長
卿《難蜀父老》注.
50 Taiping Yulan 63/4a.
51 See Mozi 82/47/1; 75/44/8; Mengzi 6A/10.
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ment about the notion of “weighing benefits and detriments” (quan li hai 權利害) 
when defining the importance of the parts compared to the whole:
於所體之中，而權輕重之謂權。權，非為是也，非非為非也。權，正也。斷指以存腕，利
之中取大，害之中取小也。害之中取小也，非取害也，取利也。其所取者，人之所執也。
遇盜人，而斷指以免身，利也；其遇盜人害也。斷指與斷腕，利於天下相若，無擇也；死
生利若，一無擇也。 
With respect to what are parts [of the body], there is the weighing of light and heavy. This is 
called “weighing”, which is not about right and wrong: it is about “weighing” being correct 
(i.e. making the correct choice). In terms of benefit, cutting off a finger to preserve the hand 
is to choose the [benefit which is] greater; in terms of harm, it is to choose the lesser [harm]: 
therefore, in terms of harm, choosing the lesser [harm] is not to choose harm, but it corre-
sponds to choosing benefit. [Sometimes] what has to be chosen depends on others: for ex-
ample, in facing a robber, to cut off a finger to spare the (whole) body is a benefit, although 
meeting a robber is, per se, harmful. Cutting off a finger and cutting off a hand are alike in 
terms of benefit to the world: there is no choice.52
Mo Di’s followers attributed to their Master the following definition of yi 義:
子墨子曰：「萬事莫貴於義。今謂人曰：『予子冠履，而斷子之手足，子為之乎？』必不為，
何故？則冠履不若手足之貴也。又曰：『予子天下而殺子之身，子為之乎？』必不為，何
故？則天下不若身之貴也。爭一言以相殺，是貴義於其身也。故曰，萬事莫貴於義也。」
Mozi said: “Of the multitude of things none is more valuable than justice. Now, if we tell 
somebody: ‘We shall give you a hat and shoes on the condition that you let us cut off your 
hands and feet. Would you agree to this?’ Of course, he would not agree, but why? Just be-
cause hats and shoes are not as valuable as hands and feet. Again (if we said), we shall give 
you the whole world on the condition that you let us kill you. Would he agree to this? Of 
course he would not agree, but why? Just because the world is not as valuable as one’s 
person. Yet if people have struggled against one another for a single principle, this shows 
that righteousness is even more valuable than one’s person. Hence we say, of the multitude 
of things none is more valuable than justice”.53
The acknowledgment that “the world is not as valuable as oneself” did not lead 
the Mohists to uphold principles somehow connected to “valuing the self” ( gui 
ji), since the request for justice due to the need for maximizing social interest 
justifies, if necessary, sacrificing the person as well. In fact, as has already been 
remarked, “if the death or life of a man brought the same benefits, in this case too, 
there would be no difference between the two choices; […] to kill oneself to save 
the world means, instead, to kill oneself to benefit the world.”54
52 Mozi 75/44/7–8.
53 Mozi 82/47/1.
54 Mozi 75/44/8.
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Such positions were almost certainly contrary to Yangist values, but it can’t 
be excluded that also other thinkers, rightly or wrongly associated with the figure 
of Yang Zhu, deemed yi more important than life itself. For example, Zi Huazi 
子華子 (ca. 380–320 B.C.) was persuaded that death is to be preferred to a 
repressed and tormented life ( po sheng 迫生), maybe precisely because of non- 
compliance with a moral duty (bu yi 不義) towards oneself:
子華子曰：「全生為上，虧生次之，死次之，迫生為下。」 […] 所謂迫生者，六欲莫得其
宜也，皆獲其所甚惡者，服是也，辱是也。辱莫大於不義，故不義，迫生也，而迫生非獨
不義也，故曰迫生不若死。
Zi Huazi said: “An intact life is best; a diminished life is next; death is lower still; a tor-
mented life is the worst”. […] In a ‘tormented life’ none of the six desires obtains its proper 
satisfaction; rather, each desire obtains only what it has a natural aversion to. Servitude 
and disgrace are instances of this. No disgrace is greater than that of being treated contrary 
to your code of conduct. Thus, to lead a tormented life means being treated immorally. But 
a tormented life does not consist merely in being treated immorally; therefore, it is said that 
a tormented life is worse than death.”55
This position does not seem to be so far from the one of Mencius, who admitted 
that the defense of yi might have entailed sacrificing one’s life if the person was 
compelled to make drastic decisions, since, as affirmed in Mozi too, yi is more 
important than one’s safety:
孟子曰：「魚，我所欲也；熊掌，亦我所欲也，二者不可得兼，舍魚而 取熊掌者也。生，
亦我所欲也；義，亦我所欲也，二者不可得兼，舍生而取義者也。生亦我所欲，所欲有甚
於生者，故不為苟得也；死亦我所惡，所惡有甚於死者， 故患有所不辟也。如使人之所
欲莫甚於生，則凡可以得生者，何不用也？使人之所惡莫甚於死者，則凡可以辟患者，何
不為也？由是則生而有不用也，由是則可以辟患而有不為也。是故所欲有甚於生者，所惡
有甚於死者，非獨賢者有是心也，人皆有之，賢者能勿喪耳。一簞食，一豆羹，得之則生，
弗得則死。嘑爾而與之，行道之人弗受；蹴爾而與之，乞人不屑也。萬鍾則不辨禮義而受
之。萬鍾於我何加焉？為宮室之美、妻妾之奉、所識窮乏者得我與？鄉為身死而不受，今
為宮室之美為之；鄉為身死而不受，今為妻妾之奉為之；鄉為身死而不受，今為所識窮乏
者得我而為之，是亦不可以已乎？此之謂失其本心。」
Mencius said: “I like fish, and I also like bear’s paws. If I cannot have the two together, I will 
let the fish go, and take the bear’s paws. So, I like life, and I also like rightness. If I cannot 
keep the two together, I will let life go, and choose rightness. I like life indeed, but there is 
that which I like more than life, and therefore, I will not seek to possess it by any improper 
ways. I dislike death indeed, but there is that which I dislike more than death, and therefore 
there are occasions when I will not avoid danger. If among the things which man likes there 
were nothing which he liked more than life, why should he not use every means by which 
he could preserve it? If among the things which man dislikes there were nothing which he 
55 Lüshi shi chunqiu 2.2/8/14, transl. Knoblock and Riegel 2000: 83, transl. mod. auct. See also 
Andreini 1998 and 2000: 61–63, 131–136.
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disliked more than death, why should he not do everything by which he could avoid danger? 
There are cases when men by a certain course might preserve life, and they do not employ 
it; when by certain things they might avoid danger, and they will not do them. Therefore, 
men have that which they like more than life, and that which they dislike more than death. 
They are not men of distinguished talents and virtue only who have this attitude of their 
heart/mind: all humans have it. What belongs to such men is simply that they do not lose it. 
Here are a small basket of rice and a platter of soup, and the case is one in which the getting 
them will preserve life, and the want of them will be death; if they are offered with an insult-
ing voice, even a tramper will not receive them, or if you first tread upon them, even a beggar 
will not stoop to take them. And yet a man will accept of ten thousand measures of grain, 
without any consideration of ritual propriety or rightness. What can the ten thousand mea-
sures of grain add to him? When he takes them, is it not that he may obtain beautiful man-
sions, that he may secure the services of wives and concubines, or that the poor and needy 
of his acquaintance may be helped by him? In the former case the offered bounty was not 
received, though it would have saved him from death, and now the emolument is taken for 
the sake of beautiful mansions. The bounty that would have been preserved from death was 
not received, and the emolument is taken to get the service of wives and concubines. The 
bounty that would have saved him from death was not received, and the emolument is 
taken that one’s poor and needy acquaintance may be helped by him. Was it then not pos-
sible likewise to decline this? This is a case of what is called ‘Losing the proper nature of 
one’s heart/mind’ ”.56
Mencius believed that in order to perform one’s own moral duties ( yi), thus obey-
ing Heaven (tian天), it was necessary to nourish ( yang 養) the inclinations of 
one’s nature (xing 性):
孟子曰：「盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣。存其心，養其性，所以事天也。殀
壽不貳，修身以俟之，所以立命也。」
Mencius said: “To make the most of one’s heart/mind is to realize one’s natural tendencies, 
and if one realizes one’s natural tendencies, one is realizing Heaven. Sustaining one’s 
heart/mind and nourishing one’s natural tendencies is how one serves Heaven. When 
neither a premature death nor long life causes a man any double-mindedness, but he waits 
in the cultivation of his personal character for whatever issue; this is the way in which he 
establishes his (Heaven-)ordained being”.57
Therefore, Mencius did not interpret the need to nourish one’s natural inclina-
tions to mean only a duty to oneself to satisfy one’s passions and desires. Under-
standing Heaven means striving to nourish mainly those components of human 
nature that contribute to harmoniously develop moral qualities whose signifi-
56 Mengzi 6A/10, transl. Legge 1895: 411–414, transl. mod. auct.
57 Mengzi 7A/1, transl. Legge 1895: 448–449, transl. mod. auct.
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cance is described, as in the previous passage of the Mozi, with the terms “big” 
(da 大) and “small” (xiao 小):
孟子曰：「人之於身也，兼所愛。兼所愛，則兼所養也。無尺寸之膚不愛焉，則無尺寸之
膚不養也。所以考其善不善者，豈有他哉？於己取之而已矣。體有貴賤，有小大。無以小
害大，無以賤害貴。養其小者為小人，養其大者為大人。今有場師，舍其梧檟，養其樲棘，
則為賤場師焉。養其一指而失其肩背，而不知也，則為狼疾人也。飲食之人，則人賤之矣，
為其養小以失大也。飲食之人無有失也，則口腹豈適為尺寸之膚哉？」
Mencius said: “There is no part of himself which a man does not love, and as he loves all, so 
he must nourish all. There is not an inch of skin which he does not love, and so there is not 
an inch of skin which he will not nourish. For examining whether his way of nourishing be 
good or not, what other rule is there but this, that he determine by reflecting on himself 
where it should be applied? Some parts of the body are noble, and some ignoble; some 
great, and some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the noble for the 
ignoble. He who nourishes the little belonging to him is a little man, and he who nourishes 
the great is a great man. Here is a plantation-keeper, who neglects his wu and jia [the 
Chinese parasol tree and the catalpa], and cultivates his sour jujube-trees; he is a poor 
plantation-keeper. He who nourishes one of his fingers, neglecting his shoulders or his 
back, without knowing that he is doing so, is a man who resembles a hurried wolf. A man 
who only eats and drinks is counted mean by others; because he nourishes what is little to 
the neglect of what is great. If a man, fond of his eating and drinking, were not to neglect 
what is of more importance, how should his mouth and belly be considered as no more than 
an inch of skin?”58
Zi Huazi, often associated to Yang Zhu’s positions, would have certainly agreed 
with Mencius’s statement according to which death is not the worst danger that 
man risks, since a repressed life ( po sheng) is surely worse, it being immoral (bu 
yi). Mencius and Zi Huazi almost certainly agreed on the fact that a deed is suit-
able from an ethical point of view ( yi) when it does not betray Heaven’s expecta-
tions and principles:59 to do so, humans fulfill the potentialities of life, of natural 
inclinations and of their own xin 心 “heart/mind”. In fact, Mencius claimed that 
one’s fulfillment could be achieved through the maturing of moral inclinations, 
which lead one to act fairly, to cultivate yi and to observe the traditional rules of 
conduct (li 禮). As for Zi Huazi, he stressed that self-realization is achieved by 
satisfying the “six desires” (liu yu 六欲) and by good health, typical aspects of an 
“intact” or “totally fulfilled life” (quan sheng 全生).
The following passage from Zhuangzi, also extant in the Lüshi chunqiu, helps 
us understand the meaning attributed by Zi Huazi to a “totally fulfilled life”:
58 Mengzi 6A/14, transl. Legge 1895: 416–417, transl. mod. auct.
59 Mengzi 7A/1.
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韓魏相與爭侵地。子華子見昭僖侯，昭僖侯有憂色。子華子曰：今使天下書銘於君之前，
書之言曰：左手攫之則右手廢，右手攫之則左手廢，然而攫之者必有天下。君能攫之乎？
昭僖侯曰：寡人不攫也。
子華子曰：甚善！自是觀之，兩臂重於天下也，身亦重於兩臂。韓之輕於天下亦遠矣，今
之所爭者，其輕於韓又遠。君固愁身傷生以憂戚不得也！
僖侯曰：善哉！教寡人者眾矣，未嘗得聞此言也。子華子可謂知輕重矣。
Han and Wei were competing with each other over some land that had been invaded. Zi 
Huazi went to see Marquis Zhaxi who had a mournful look.
Zi Huazi said, “Supposing, my lord, that all under heaven were to sign an agreement before 
you stating that ‘Should the left hand seize it, the right hand will be disabled; should the 
right hand seize it, the left hand will be disabled. Yet he who seizes it will certainly gain all 
under heaven’: Would you seize it?”
“I would not seize it,” said Marquis Zhaoxi.
“Very good!” said Zi Huazi. “Judging from this, your two arms are more important than all 
under heaven, but your person is even more important than your two arms. Han is far less 
significant than all under heaven, but what you are competing over now is far less signifi-
cant than Han. Why, my lord, must you worry your person and injure your life by fretting 
over something you can’t get?”
“Excellent!” said Marquis Xi. “Many are those who have instructed me, but I have never 
heard this sort of advice.”
Zi Huazi may be said to have known what was insignificant and what was important.60
Underlining the nonsense that is the bartering of any part of one’s body in 
exchange for the world, Zi Huazi’s claim is similar to Yang Zhu’s position as re-
corded in the Liezi 61 and, implicitly, also in the Han Feizi.62 Besides confirming a 
real affinity between the two thinkers, this shows that Yang Zhu, unlike what is 
reported in Mengzi, did not refuse to offer a hair to help the world, yet he probably 
refused, in principle, the sacrifice of a part of his body to obtain wealth and mate-
rial goods.
Almost certainly, Mencius was aware of Zi Huazi’s theories since they were 
contemporaries, and if so, the former couldn’t but assimilate Yang Zhu’s and Zi 
Huazi’s doctrines. As already observed, Mencius probably borrowed the “hair” 
topos from the legend featuring Yu, patron of the Mohists and a great example of 
abnegation, as the protagonist. In doing so, Mencius started from an incontro-
vertible matter of fact: Mozi, while trying to achieve his altruistic goal, agreed to 
be identified with Yu, who committed himself so deeply to rescuing the world that 
when he tamed the great deluge there was no hair left on his calves, no hair on his 
shins.
60 Zhuangzi 77/28/18, transl. Mair 1994: 287, transl. mod. auct. See also Lüshi chunqiu 21.4/141/19.
61 See Liezi 7/41/18.
62 See Han Feizi 50.4.4.
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Let us assume for the purposes of speculation, that the “hair” topos did not 
originally belong to Yang Zhu’s message and that, upon compiling the Mengzi, 
there were no professed Yangist sources that could belie a possible biased misin-
terpretation of Yangist doctrines. Starting from this assumption, we can infer that 
Mencius, using the plot of Yu’s legend in order to stress the contrast between the 
“indefatigable altruist” Mozi and some thinkers supporting the opposite ethical 
position – i.e. that would never give up anything of himself to rescue others – 
chose the obscure Yang Zhu. The reason was probably because, as documented in 
the previously translated passage, Zi Huazi was associated with the refusal to 
offer a hand, a not a hair, in exchange for the world.
The strategies adopted by Mencius during the process of inventio are, there-
fore, extremely sophisticated. Inventio is the procedure of forming and develop-
ing an argument that is compelling and persuasive. By providing the rhetorician 
with sets of instructions and ideas, inventio investigates the possible means by 
which the proofs appropriate for a specific rhetorical situation can be selected. 
Aristotle answered Plato’s attack against rhetoric by arguing that rhetoric and 
reason are tied together.63 While dialectic is the way for discovering truths which 
are supposed to be universal, rhetoric clarifies and communicates arguments 
using whatever strategy to produce a specific effect on the mind of the hearer or 
reader: to persuade. In order to communicate arguments successfully, the rheto-
rician must be able to produce valid sets of cases supporting his or her thesis. The 
systematic approach to produce persuasive discourse and generate arguments is 
provided through the use of a topos, i.e. a topic which defines “a place or store or 
thesaurus to which one resorted in order to find something to say on a given sub-
ject.”64 A topos is a category that helps to delineate the relationship among ideas. 
Topoi are “lines of arguments” or “common notions”, in many cases deriving 
from the adaptation of traditional material, destined to constitute standardized 
patterns. Mencius creates new topoi by extending and adapting the legend of Yu 
and forging the Yang-Mo symbol. He was a real master of inventio: 
Invention is the art of discovering new arguments and uncovering new things by argument 
[… it] extends from the construction of formal arguments to all modes of enlarging experi-
ence by reason as manifested in awareness, emotion, interest, and appreciation.65 
63 “Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic”, Aristotle states in the incipit of his Rhetoric. See 
Aristotle ed. 1984: 3.
64 Corbett 1971: 35.
65 McKeon 1987: 59.
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In crafting a persuasive piece of rhetoric against Yang and Mo, the legend of Yu, 
focused on “one single hair of the body-all the hairs” versus/pro “the world”, 
was extremely effective once incorporated into his perfectly balanced rhetorical 
discourse. Such narrative became Mencius’s main “evidence” and provided him 
with a solid framework upon which to elaborate a rhetorical attack against ethi-
cal deviances, which was destined to serve as model for future generations of Ru 
thinkers.
1.2.1 The power of imitation
“One of the great constants in rhetoric is the doctrine of imitation”.66
If used as an instrument of rhetorical invention, imitatio goes beyond an empty 
re-creation of old models, because imitation is “a complex process that allows 
historical texts to serve as equipment for future rhetorical arguments […] Imita-
tion of the structure and language of an old text may help introduce radically new 
ideas”.67 The imitative model helps authors make different texts and different the-
ories interact and create new patterns of discourse. In order to suit circumstances, 
the rhetorician is similar to a “bricoleur” who assembles linguistic “bricks” to 
build his/her persuasive strategy. Scholars have pointed out that invention (and 
a fortiori, imitation) is a social process, a process of discovery of rhetorical strate-
gies which takes place within a specific intellectual tradition in which the rheto-
rician is no longer a creator, an “originator”, but rather a point of intersection of 
textual (and intertextual) models.68
Old voices and structures can be recovered as a consequence of new circum-
stances in order to produce “usable traditions”,69 as Mencius probably did by 
coining the “Yang-Mo” category.
Mencius saw himself to be imitating models from antiquity and placed him-
self in the line of succession of these paradigmatic figures such as Zhou Gong and 
Confucius. By having re-created order out of disorder, those exemplary figures 
had all done exactly what Mencius was aiming at through his words: rectify peo-
ple’s heart-mind.
66 Winterowd 1970: 161. 
67 Leff 1997: 201–203.
68 See Still and Worton 1990: 1; see also Gaonkar 1993.
69 Cox 1987: 203.
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Yang Xiong 揚雄 (53 B.C.–18 A.D.), during the Han period, Han Yu 韓愈 (768–
824) during the Tang 唐 (618–907), and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) during the Song 
宋 (960–1279) would all have gained a position in this line of succession, celebrat-
ing the dao 道 of the Ru as the main path of virtue leading from antiquity to the 
present.
Yang Xiong’s work, for example, reveals the increasing relevance of the idea 
of orthodoxy in the wake of Han Wudi’s 武帝 (r. 141–87 BCE) appreciation of the 
Ru doctrine and the ensuing decrease of importance of the non-Ru traditions. 
Yang Xiong was extremely clear in distinguishing between “the path of right prin-
ciples” (zhengdao 正道) and “the path of heterodox, crooked principles” (xie dao 
邪道):
好書而不要諸仲尼，書肆也。好說而不要諸仲尼，說鈴也。君子言也無擇，聽也無淫，擇
則亂，淫則辟。述正道而稍邪哆者有矣，未有述邪哆而稍正也。
People who love books but do not seek instruction from Confucius are like a bookshop. 
Those who love to engage in persuasion but do not seek instruction from Confucius talk like 
jingling bells. What the exemplary person says does not corrupt others. What he listens to is 
reported without exaggeration. Corruption results in disorder. Exaggeration results in moral 
turpitude. There have been those who transmitted the correct dao but gradually went 
crooked; but there has never been anyone who transmitted the crooked dao and gradually 
went correct.70
或問「道」。曰：「道也者，通也，無不通也。」或曰：「可以適它與？」曰：「適堯、舜、
文王者為正道，非堯、舜、文王者為它道。君子正而不它。」
Someone asked about the dao. Master Yang said: “The dao is pervasive – there is nothing it 
does not penetrate.”
The other said: “Can it lead in other directions?”
Master Yang said: “That which leads to Shun, Yao, and King Wen is the correct dao. Those 
which do not lead to Shun, Yao, and King Wen are the other daos. The exemplary person 
follows the correct one and not the others.”71
或曰：「刑 ( 形 ) 名非道邪？何自然也？」曰：「何必刑 ( 形 ) 名，圍棋、擊劍、反目、眩形，
亦皆自然也。由其大者作正道，由其小者作奸道。」
Someone said: “If the doctrine of ‘forms and names’ does not accord with the dao, why is it 
as such?”
Master Yang said: “Why must it be different from what it is? Chess, fencing, acrobatics, and 
magic are all ‘as they are’. Create the correct dao out of its best element, while the weak 
point will bring to a dao of perversion.”72
70 Yangzi fayan 揚子法言 2.14, transl. Bullock 2011: 53 transl. mod. auct.
71 Yangzi fayan 4.1, transl. Bullock 2011: 69, transl. mod. auct.
72 Yangzi fayan 4.23, transl. Bullock 2011: 80, transl. mod. auct.
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Starting from such premises, it is not surprising that Yang Xiong too placed 
himself in the line of succession of those who preserve the orthodox dao and 
obviously used the Yang-Mo symbol:
古者楊墨塞路，孟子辭而辟之，廓如也。後之塞路者有矣，竊自比於孟子。
Among the ancients, Yang Zhu and Mo Di blocked the road, Mencius spoke and burst it 
open, making the road broad. There were others after him who blocked the road. I humbly 
compare myself to Mencius.73
The emergence of an “orthodoxy” implies political unity, for no single doctrine 
can become the ideology of a society unless there is a centralized political author-
ity. After the fall of the Han dynasty in 220 AD, the Yang-Mo symbol faded into 
disuse, though it became central again during the Tang and retained relevance 
down through the Qing 清 (1644–1911). The Yang-Mo symbol was not so important 
between the Han and the re-establishment of the empire under the Sui 隋 (581–
618) because the Ru ideology clearly declined and a new socio-political situation 
arose: the old bureaucratic ideal shaped to consolidate the position of the ruling 
Han elites and to protect them from the danger of the centrifugal forces was re-
placed by an aristocratic one.
The reunification of the empire under the Sui reestablished cultural homoge-
neity throughout areas where local cultures and new doctrines had proliferated 
over three centuries. During the Sui and the Tang dynasties, the bureaucracy tried 
to reestablish control over its ideology by fostering new interpretations of the Ru 
system, first asserting the supremacy of its deep-rooted tradition, then by system-
atizing Ru doctrines in such a way that they could compete with any of the reli-
gious, metaphysical and intellectual systems developed within the Daoist and 
Buddhist communities. Han Yu was probably the most distinguished scholar in 
the Tang Dynasty to re-adapt the Yang-Mo dualism. That symbol provided think-
ers like Han Yu an authoritative and historical topos of the proper stance of the 
“scholar”: one who fights against ethical deviance. Moreover, the Yang-Mo dual-
ism offered a methodological framework that suited the aspirations of thinkers 
like Zhu Xi, who re-defined the Ru “mean-oriented” ideology and favored the 
adaption of the Mencian Yang-Mo symbol in order to equate Chan 禪 Buddhism to 
Yang Zhu’s tendency to withdraw from social community and to equate mendi-
cant and ascetic Buddhist orders with Mo, because they seemed to be totally com-
mitted to society.74
73 Yangzi fayan 2.20. Bullock 2011: 55, transl. mod. auct.
74 See Lyell 1962: 38–54, 92–94.
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1.3  Jin xin II 盡心下 ( Mengzi 7B/72)
孟子曰：「逃墨必歸於楊，逃楊必歸於儒。歸，斯受之而已矣。今之與楊墨辯者，如追放豚，
既入其苙，又從而招之。」
Mencius said: “Those who are fleeing from Mo naturally turn to Yang, and those who are 
fleeing from Yang naturally turn to the Ru. When they so turn, they should at once and 
simply be received. Those who nowadays dispute with the followers of Yang and Mo do so 
as if they were pursuing a stray pig, the leg of which, after they have got it to enter the pen, 
they proceed to tie.”75
Does the previous passage suggest that Mencius recognized a close connection 
between Yang Zhu’s and Ru’s teaching? This is a hypothesis expressed by Wang 
Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086), although he noticed that Yang Zhu, like Mo Di, di-
verged from the sages’ moral example.76 Nonetheless, He Jingqun 何敬群 (1903–
1983)77 maintains that Wang Anshi’s analysis is reductive and does not fully grasp 
the real meaning of Mencius’s position. Making a quite questionable assumption, 
He Jingqun even claims that Mencius’s argument, hypothetically, should have 
been as follows: “those who run away from Mo, inevitably turn to Yang; those 
who run away from Yang, inevitably turn to the Ru and those who run away from 
Ru, finally go back to Mo”.
A seeming convergence between the Ru and the Yangists might be detected in 
certain attitudes of non-cooperation with political authority and refusal to accept 
public offices. However, it is necessary to draw some careful distinctions. Behind 
the Yangist choice there seems to be a utilitarian evaluation between the benefits 
resulting from the acquisition of fame and wealth and the risk of endangering 
the most valuable personal good, i.e. life. For the Ru, instead, the imperative is 
basically ethical: some hermits or recluses are such only “temporarily”. It is the 
adverse historical situation that demands the withdrawal from political life, par-
ticularly in those cases in which the sovereign and his government do not uphold 
the Ru values.78
Several scholars recognized the secular character of the eremitism in ancient 
China. Alan J. Berkowitz maintains that
[…] withdrawal usually meant withdrawal from active participation in an official career in 
the state of bureaucracy. Reclusion was typically secular, and religious devotion was but 
one of any number of advocations pursued by individuals who had renounced public ser-
75 Mengzi 7B/72, transl. Legge 1895: 491, transl. mod. auct.
76 See Wang Anshi quanji 王安石全集 1974, 2: 142. See also Luan Tiaofu 欒調甫 1957: 67.
77 See He Jingqun 1979: 15.
78 Lunyu 5/7, 8/13, 9/7, 11/24, 15/7.
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vice […] And renunciation in China did not necessarily imply ascetic self-denial: it meant 
the repudiation of a role in the service of local or state authority […] The “Confucian” with-
drew as an ethical reaction against the political or moral order of the times, thereby frustrat-
ing his personal commitment to public service; the “Taoist” withdrew out of his disdain for 
worldly involvement, thereby fulfilling his ambition.79
Confucius stated that subjects have the duty of serving their sovereign,80 but, at 
the same time, he also justified disobedience, or better say, renounced govern-
ment responsibilities in case of a conflict with what is morally appropriate ( yi). As 
Li Chi observes:
[…] as early as the time of Confucius the concept of recluse had begun to change from a man 
who had renounced the world and had hidden himself in the wilderness to one who kept 
himself apart from the world of affairs and yet was anxious to make himself heard. […] it is 
apparent that Confucius and his followers and the recluses were each conscious of belong-
ing to two camps. Nevertheless, Confucius had a high regard for recluses and in moments of 
frustration could even suggest that he withdraw from the world by floating to sea on the raft. 
[…] Confucius felt alone in being the only man who really knew when to seek office and 
when to retire, and he provided the traditional Confucian justification for reclusion with his 
opinion that the junzi should consider it shameful not to serve under an enlightened ruler 
and equally shameful to hold office under an unenlightened ruler.81
By investing man with a high degree of moral responsibility,82 Confucius contrib-
uted to preparing the grounds for a lively debate on the question of accepting or 
refusing political office. This led to the primary need to draw a sharp distinction 
between two attitudes – the Yangist and the Ru – which risked appearing similar. 
Mencius’s explanation, as may be expected, soon arrived.
Shun Kwong-loi examined the following passage 4B/29 in the Mengzi, observ-
ing that its meaning should be grasped in the light of Mencius’s criticism of Yang 
Zhu and Mo Di.83 Mencius implicitly wanted to stress that the stubbornness with 
which Yu and Ji 稷 worked for the world’s sake was different from Mo Di’s altru-
ism and that Yan Hui’s 顏回 behavior (ca. 521–481 B.C.) could be assimilated to 
Yang Zhu’s only at first glance.
79 Berkowitz 1992: 2–4.
80 Lunyu 2/18, 2/19, 2/20, 4/14, 5/6, 5/16, 6/8, 12/22, 13/2, 13/13, 15/32.
81 Li Chi 1962–1963: 237–238.
82 See Berkowitz (1992: 8), who stated that “withdrawal was a measure of the individual’s to 
resolve: regardless of the dangers or attractions of service, and regardless of the motivation for 
avoiding it, he strove to maintain his personal integrity, autonomy and self-reliance […] With-
drawal, then, was a form of individualism in action …”. See also Vervoorn 1990: 29.
83 See Shun Kwong-loi 1997b: 69–70, who based his criticism on Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi 張栻 
(1133–1180) exegesis. See also Kano Naoki 狩野直喜 (1868–1947) ed. 1987: 38.
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Mencius exalted Yu, Ji and Yan Hui precisely because they were able to 
answer in a different way to what circumstances imposed on them, although the 
three of them actually followed the same dao. Yan Hui’s behavior would have 
been the same as Yu’s and Ji’s if only he had been in their place, and vice versa:
禹、稷當平世，三過其門而不入，孔子賢之。顏子當亂世，居於陋巷。一簞食，一瓢飲。
人不堪其憂，顏子不改其樂，孔子賢之。孟子曰：「禹、稷、顏回同道。禹思天下有溺者，
由己溺之也；稷思天下有飢者，由己飢之也，是以如是其急也。禹、稷、顏子易地則皆然。
今有同室之人鬬者，救之，雖被髮纓冠而救之，可也。鄉鄰有鬬者，被髮纓冠而往救之，
則惑也，雖閉戶可也。」
Yu and Ji, in an age when the world was being brought back to order, thrice passed their 
doors without entering them. Confucius praised them. The disciple Yan, in an age of disor-
der, dwelt in a mean narrow lane, having his single bamboo-cup of rice, and his single 
gourd-dish of water; other men could not have endured the distress, but he did not allow his 
joy to be affected by it. Confucius praised him. Mencius said: “Yu, Ji, and Yan Hui agreed in 
the principle of their conduct. Yu thought that if any one in the kingdom were drowned, it 
was as if he drowned him. Ji thought that if any one in the kingdom suffered hunger, it was 
as if he famished him. It was on this account that they were so earnest. If Yu and Ji, and 
Yanzi, had exchanged places, each would have done what the other did. Here now in the 
same apartment with you are people fighting – you ought to part them. Though you part 
them with your cap simply tied over your unbound hair, your conduct will be allowable. If 
the fighting be only in the village or neighbourhood, if you go to put an end to it with your 
cap tied over your hair unbound, you will be in error. Although you should shut your door 
in such a case, your conduct would be allowable”.84
The central issue of this passage lies, in my opinion, in the definition of the un- 
expressed concept of quan 權 “evaluate, weigh, measure”. We saw how Mencius 
turned to quan just after criticizing Yang and Mo, also referring to a third figure, 
unfortunately ignored in the received literature, i.e. Zi Mo 子莫:85
Zi Mo holds a medium between these (zhi zhong 執中). By holding that medium, he is nearer 
the right. But by holding it without leaving room for evaluating the exigency of circum-
stances (wu quan 無權), it becomes like their holding their one point. The reason why I hate 
that holding to one point is the injury it does to the way of right principle. It takes up one 
point and disregards a hundred others.86
Here again we have two ideal extremes with a mean position between the two. 
However, Mencius is fully convinced that Zi Mo is too inflexible. If Qian Mu 錢穆 
84 Mengzi 4B/29, transl. Legge 1895: 335–336, transl. mod. auct.
85 Carine Defoort suggested that the bamboo manuscript Tang Yu zhi dao from Guodian is relat-
ed to Zi Mo’s doctrine. See Defoort 2004.
86 Mengzi 7A/26, transl. Legge 1895: 464, transl. mod. auct.
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(1895–1990)87 is right in identifying Zi Mo with the son of Zi Zhang 子張 (503– ? 
B.C.), then this would seem to imply that in Mencius’s eyes there are some Ru who 
hold to the doctrine of the “mean” too rigidly. In discussing this passage, Qian Mu 
points out that if the importance of Yang Zhu in Mencius time was as great as 
Mencius would have us believe, then it is surprising that there is little reference to 
him in pre-Qin and Han-literature. Qian Mu is of the opinion that the really dom-
inant intellectual lineages were the Ru and the Mohists. He believes that this was 
generally acknowledged during the pre-imperial era, while the statement of Men-
cius is only one man’s opinion set forth for polemical aims. For the same reasons, 
Qian Mu argues, Mencius pushed the doctrines of both Yang and Mo to their log-
ical extremes before attacking them.88 We already saw how Mencius followed a 
hyperbolic approach which exaggerated both the failings of Yang and Mo and the 
virtues of his fellows Ru.
With regard to Mencius’ evaluation of Yang and Mo, Marcel Granet has 
written:
Brillant écrivain, Mencius est plutôt un polémiste qu’un penseur. Il se plaît à se mettre en 
scène, discutant avec de grands personnages. Il se présente comme un homme qui se serait 
donné la tâche de publier les principes de Confucius afin d’empêcher que « les paroles de 
Yang tseu et de Mö tseu (ne) remplissent le Monde ». Il défendait la sagesse confucéenne en 
la définissant comme une sagesse de juste milieu, également distante de deux utopies per-
nicieuses. Mencius est un politicien, et il argumente en rhéteur: les adversaires qu’il attaque 
de front ne sont point ceux qu’il désire surtout atteindre. Ses véritables adversaires, ce sont 
les Légistes. Au gouvernement par les Lois, il oppose le gouvernement par les Sages … A vrai 
dire, ce qui a fait la gloire de Mencius, ce ne sont pas ses thèses rhétoriciennes, mais son 
attitude. Il a été le premier champion de l’orthodoxie … Il a été le premier des lettrés. Et il en 
a fixé le type.89
Mencius, in defining the Ru system as a celebration of zhong 中 (the equilibrium, 
or “sense of moral balance”), employed a powerful and evocative category in 
order to prove that the Ru tradition embodied all the good points of the doctrines 
of the rival lineages, while not reaching the same radical extremes. The Yang-Mo 
symbol, by virtue of its own logic, defines the Ru’s path as the “middle way” – 
better still as the “balanced attitude” – and implies that any step which deviates 
87 Qian Mu 1935: 229–233. According to Qian Mu, Zi Mo might be identified with Shen Xiang 
申詳, the son of Zi Zhang, whose family name was Zhuan Sun 顓孫. By following traces of this 
evidence, Qian Mu argued that Zi Mo was probably the figure addressed as Zhuan Sun Zi Mo 
顓孫子莫 in Shuoyuan 說苑 (Garden of Persuasions) 19.32/168/16.
88 On the rhetorical effects produced through amplificatio or exaggeratio in the European Clas-
sical languages, see Lausberg 1969: 49 and Mortara Garavelli 1997: 109.
89 Granet 1950: 561.
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from this dao will necessarily lead to a rejection of both social and family institu-
tions and the heretical excesses of Yang and Mo.
The Ru emphasis on zhong 中 is a constant topos in Ru literature.90 However, 
as observed by Maurizio Scarpari, the meaning of this term should be grasped 
with more precision:
Un corretto bilanciamento implica necessariamente cercare il punto di equilibrio con 
flessibilità e mobilità, con una libertà di movimento che rifugga ogni forma di rigidità o 
condizionamento, adattandosi alle circostanze che si presentano di volta in volta, senza 
rinunciare alla prospettiva d’insieme. Il ricorso al termine zhong che significa «centro» non 
facilita la comprensione di questo processo, richiamando a un’idea troppo geometrica di 
equidistanza. Se immaginiamo l’asta della stadera, il concetto risulta forse più comprensi-
bile: pesi e contrappesi si spostano lungo l’asta e facilitano la ricerca del punto di equilibrio, 
garantendo così il miglior bilanciamento possibile.91
By examining another Ru thinker, Xunzi, we can arrive at a clearer perspective on 
the meaning of the Yang-Mo symbol, and the peculiar meaning of zhong within 
the Mengzi. Xunzi has been considered as the “moulder” of early Ruism, but he 
has not enjoyed great favor among the Ru themselves, probably because of the 
strong impact of Zhu Xi’s criticism of Xunzi’s doctrine of xing 性 “human nature”, 
a theory that attacked Mencius’s system of thought at its very heart.
The following passage taken from the Xunzi is suggestive in depicting a dis-
pute between the Ru and their opponents. However, it does so against a back-
ground different to that of Mencius. There are no longer two radically opposed 
“heresies” to fight, but rather a strict adherence to a path defined by the pivotal 
values defined as li yi 禮義 (not ren yi 仁義, as in Mencius) which, by themselves, 
are capable of preventing the danger of the Mohist’s “li 利/hai 害-oriented” moral 
attitude and of fulfilling both ethical and natural human expectations:
90 Among the Tsinghua University’s (Qinghua Daxue 清華大學) collection of bamboo manu-
scripts from the Warring States period, the Baoxun 保訓 (Instructions for Preservation) offers 
new important elements on the meaning of zhong in early Chinese texts. See Chan 2012; Li Ling 
李零 2009; Liao Liyong 梁立勇 2010; Liao Mingchun 廖名春 2011; Liu Guangsheng 劉光勝 2013; 
Wang Zhiping 王志平 2011.
91 “A correct balance necessarily implies to seek the balance point with flexibility and mobility, 
with a freedom of movement that eschews any form of rigidity or conditioning, by adapting to 
circumstances without sacrificing the overall perspective. The use of the term zhong which 
means “center” does not facilitate the understanding of this process, referring to a geometric 
idea of equidistance. If we imagine the arm of a steelyard, the concept is perhaps more clear: 
weights and counterweights are moved along the arm and facilitate the search for the point of 
equilibrium, thus ensuring the best balance possible.” (Scarpari 2010: 154–155, transl. auct).
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故人苟生之為見，若者必死；苟利之為見，若者必害；苟怠惰偷懦之為安，若者必危；苟
情說之為樂，若者必滅。故人一之於禮義，則兩得之矣；一之於情性，則兩喪之矣。故儒
者將使人兩得之者也，墨者將使人兩喪之者也，是儒墨之分也。
Accordingly, if one acts with only preservation of his own life in view, death is inevitable. If 
one acts with only profit in mind, loss is certain. If one is indolent and timorous, thinking 
thereby he will be safe, danger is certain. If he seeks happiness through self-gratification, 
destruction is certain.
Thus, if a man concentrates single-mindedly on ritual and moral principles, then both his 
desires and ritual will be fulfilled; but if he concentrates solely on his inborn desires and 
emotions, then both will be lost. Hence, Ru practices will cause a man to fulfill both ritual 
and desires, whereas Mohist practices will cause him to lose both. Such is the distinction 
between the Ru and the Mohists.92
Xunzi points out that the central experience of human life takes place within the 
social community and that to preserve and protect it we all need an intentional 
commitment to li yi “ritual and moral principles”, established by the Sage Kings 
of antiquity to end disorder. Humans need li “ritual, ceremonial rules of proper 
conduct” in order to perpetuate society. Contrary to what Mo Di believed, Xunzi 
argues that
先王惡其亂也，故制禮義以分之，使有貧富貴賤之等，足以相兼臨者，是養天下之本也。
書曰：「維齊非齊。」此之謂也。
The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder. Thus, they instituted regulations, ritual prac-
tices, and moral principles in order to create proper social class divisions. They ordered that 
there be sufficient gradations of wealth and eminence of station to bring everyone under 
supervision. This is the fundamental principle by which to nurture the whole world. The 
Book of document says: “There is equality only insofar as they are not equal”. This expresses 
my point.93
故先王明禮義以壹之，致忠信以愛之，尚賢使能以次之，爵服慶賞以申重之，時其事，輕
其任，以調齊之，潢然兼覆之，養長之，如保赤子。
Accordingly, the Ancient Kings elucidated ritual and moral principles in order to unify 
them, were loyal and honest in the extreme to manifest love for them, elevated the worthy 
and employed the able in order to put them in sequence, and created ranks, robes, commen-
dations, and incentives in order to further emphasize to further emphasize this gradation. 
They undertook tasks only at proper season and lightened the people’s obligations in order 
to make them concordant and uniformly regulated. ‘Like a vast flood of surging waters, they 
universally covered over them.’ They nourished and led them “as though they were watch-
ing over an infant.”94
Thanks to inequality and social distinctions, such remarkable cultural achieve-
ments have been possible. Therefore, Mozi, Xunzi said, is missing the mark in 
92 Xunzi 19/90/16, transl. Knoblock 1994: 56–57.
93 Xunzi 9/3/3, transl. Knoblock 1990: 96.
94 Xunzi 10/10/8, transl. Knoblock 1990: 132.
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stressing equality and criticizing the different levels of funeral observance, the 
rules of proper conduct (li 禮), and ritual music ( yue 樂). Mozi’s attack on li and 
yue must have seemed to Xunzi like an attack on Zhou civilization itself:
墨子曰：「樂者、聖王之所非也，而儒者為之過也。」君子以為不然。樂者，聖人之所樂也，
而可以善民心，其感人深，其移風易俗。故先王導之以禮樂，而民和睦。[…] 故樂者，所
以道樂也，金石絲竹，所以道德也；樂行而民鄉方矣。故樂也者，治人之盛者也，而墨子
非之。
Mozi says: “Music was something the sage kings condemned; so the Ru err in making 
music.” The gentleman considers that this is not true. Music was enjoyed by the sage kings; 
it can make the heart/mind of the people good; it deeply stirs men; and it alters their man-
ners and changes their customs.
Thus, the Ancient Kings guided the people with ritual and music, and the people became 
harmonious and friendly. […] Therefore, musical performances are the means of guiding 
enjoyment.
‘The instruments of metal, stone, silk, and bamboo are the means to guide the music, for 
whenever music is performed, the people sit in the direction to face it.’ Thus, music is the 
most perfect method of bringing order to men. Yet Mozi condemns it!95
Mozi not only condemns the institutions, practices and principles of social class 
division, but also attacks the harmonizing elements that accompany them. In the 
following passage, as we already saw in Mencius, Xunzi uses the image of the 
early Kings as the defenders of orthodoxy and the punishers of moral deviances 
and, to a certain extent, Xunzi also implies a comparison between himself and 
the ancient model of virtuosity:
且樂也者，和之不可變者也；禮也者， 理之不可易者也。樂合同， 禮別異， 禮樂之統，
管乎人心矣。 窮本極變， 樂之情也；著誠去偽，禮之經也。墨子非之，幾遇刑也。明王已沒，
莫之正也。愚者學之，危其身也。君子明樂，乃其德也。亂世惡善，不此聽也。於乎哀哉！
不得成也。弟子勉學，無所營也。
Furthermore, music embodies harmonies that can never be altered, just as ritual embodies 
principles of natural order that can never be changed. Music joins together what is common 
to all; ritual separates what is different. The guiding principles of ritual and music act as the 
pitch pipe that disciplines the human heart/mind. It is the essential nature of music to seek 
to exhaust the root of things and to carry change to its highest degree. It is the continuous 
theme of ritual to illuminate what is genuine and to eliminate what is artificial. Mozi attacks 
both music and ritual, he almost met with punishment, but the wise kings had already 
passed away, and no one corrected him. Stupid people learn his doctrines and endanger 
themselves. The exemplary person is clear about music, but he is born in an evil generation 
which hates goodness and will not listen to him.96
For Xunzi, zhong coincides precisely with the ethical imperative that inspired the 
former Kings in the creation of ritual and moral principles (li yi):
95 Xunzi 20/2/5, transl. Knoblock 1994: 83.
96 Xunzi 20/3/7, transl. Knoblock 1994: 84, transl. mod. auct.
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先王之道，仁之隆也，比中而行之。曷謂中？曰：禮義是也。道者，非天之道，非地之道，
人之所以道也，君子之所道也。
The Way of the Ancient Kings lay in exalting the principle of goodness and in following 
zhong (the sense of moral balance) in their conduct. What is meant by zhong? I say that it is 
correctly identified with ritual and moral principles. The Way of which I speak is not the 
Way of Heaven or the Way of Earth, but rather the Way that guides the actions of mankind 
and is embodied in the conduct of the exemplary person.97
From the perspective of Xunzi’s attitude toward Mozi, the meaning of Mencius’s 
Yang-Mo symbol emerges with greater clarity. In this specific case, Xunzi’s attack 
focused mainly – though not, of course, exclusively – on the Mohists and was 
based on the power of the moral authority of the legacy represented by liyi, a cate- 
gory that, in itself, defines the set of duties and relations inside and outside the 
family, thus covering a domain that, in other words, is both nei 內 “inner, private, 
familiar” and wai 外 “outer, external”.
Mencius, on the contrary, develops a two-part rhetorical answer, addressing 
not just one target, but attacking both parties which hold, in his opinion, irrecon-
cilable and diametrically opposed positions. Thus, he made room for the Ru tra-
dition that necessarily had to place itself at the center of the “rhetorical space” he 
had conceived. From Mencius’s point of view, Yang Zhu and Mo Di were stuck in 
antithetical, absolutist positions, far away from the preferred mean. Neverthe-
less, one could not arrive at this mean position a priori, without a previous evalu-
ation. Just because Zi Mo held a rigorously intermediate position, he still deserved 
to be blamed because his choice, in Mencius’s opinion, was a priori and preju-
diced, as it was not determined by an evaluation of the circumstances.
It is clear that Mencius felt the need to state that moral action always implies 
an interpretation of the self, which, instead of being a unique indivisible individ-
ual, is an aggregation of specific social relations. It is therefore necessary to care-
fully assess (quan) if the situation is such as to require, for example, a sacrifice, or 
a minor formal violation of the rules of ritual behavior (li 禮): 
淳于髡曰：「男女授受不親，禮與？」
孟子曰：「禮也。」
曰：「嫂溺則援之以手乎？」
曰：「嫂溺不援，是豺狼也。男女授受不親，禮也；嫂溺援之以手者，權也。」
曰：「今天下溺矣，夫子之不援，何也？」
曰：「天下溺，援之以道；嫂溺，援之以手。子欲手援天下乎？」
Chun Yu Kun said: “Is it the rule of propriety that males and females shall not allow their 
hands to touch in giving or receiving anything?”
Mencius replied: “It is a rule of propriety.”
97 Xunzi 20/8/23, transl. Knoblock 1990: 71, transl. mod. auct.
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Kun asked: “If a man’s sister-in-law be drowning, shall he rescue her with his hand?”
“He who would not so rescue the drowning woman is a wolf”, said Mencius. “For males and 
females not to allow their hands to touch in giving and receiving is the general rule of pro-
priety; when a sister-in-law is drowning, to rescue her with the hand is a matter of evaluat-
ing a peculiar exigency.”
Kun said: “The whole kingdom is drowning. How strange it is that you will not rescue it!”
Mencius answered: “A drowning kingdom must be rescued with right principles, as a 
drowning sister-in-law has to be rescued with the hand. Do you wish me to rescue the king-
dom with my hand?”98
The exemplary person is able to mediate between his own ambitions and the de-
mands of his context on the one hand, and between the codes of conduct crystal-
lized over time and “peculiar exigencies” on the other. Mencius gives a balanced 
answer, albeit still prescriptive in its tone. The codes of conduct should be com-
plied with whilst also taking into account the correct interpretation of subjective 
circumstances. In other words, we cannot always put only ourselves (as Yang Zhu 
wished) or only others (as Mozi wished) first.
Therefore, passage 4B/29 of the Mengzi provides evidence of the terms by 
which Mencius referred to certain pseudo-individualistic attitudes among the Ru, 
but a careful contextual evaluation (quan) removes any doubts relating to the 
alleged immorality of those Ru figures such as Yan Hui, which was different, de-
spite appearances, from Yang Zhu’s “non-collaborationist” position – in political 
terms.
2 What are Yang and Mo standing for?
The passages from Mengzi quoted above show how Mencius’s priority was to 
hinder the spread of Yang and Mo’s doctrines in order to create the conditions 
required to reaffirm the Ruist moral path. Let us now proceed to verify whether 
the juxtaposition between Yang and Mo emerging from the wei wo-jian ai and wu 
jun-wu fu categories can be clarified in relation to two core values of the Ru ethical 
system, namely ren 仁 “goodness, humanity” and yi 義“justice, sense of what is 
right, righteousness, moral appropriateness”.
98 Mengzi 4A/17, transl. Legge 1895: 308, transl. mod. auct.
  The Yang Mo 楊墨 dualism   1155
2.1  Ren  仁
Mencius argued that ren lies in the heart-mind (xin 心)99 and represents the distin-
guishing feature of the superior man, namely the person bearing full moral au-
thority (renzhe 仁者). When associated with the “emotional” and affective dimen-
sion, ren means “loving other” (ai ren 愛人)100 and entails both the refusal to hurt 
one’s fellow men,101 and the inability to tolerate other people’s suffering.102 As 
Lin Yü-sheng claims “ren is a protean quality of virtue; it can only be cultivated 
and developed in inter-human relationships, i.e., in a social context.”103 The 
same author argues that Confucius extended the meaning of ren from “manli-
ness, manhood” to “all-inclusive moral virtue as well as the highest moral attain-
ment that a man can achieve in life by human effort”, and also “the dynamic 
process of cultivation and development of what is distinctively in him.”104
It seems that the notion of ren does is not limited to abiding by filial duty, but 
rather includes the whole balance of human relations within social institutions. 
Though acknowledging its central role, David L.Hall and Roger T. Ames tend to 
consider the family structure as a contingent factor, in the sense that “non spe-
cific formal structure, even family, is necessary”, since “the institution of family 
is itself an abstraction from particular concrete relationships that are themselves 
always unique.”105
The explication of ren through qin 親 “affection, love towards one parents; 
being intimate” in the Shuowen jiezi 說文解字 (Explaining graphs and analyzing 
characters)106 does not mean that the ultimate sense of ren must be found only in 
affection towards relatives: self-cultivation grounded in ren actually implies a 
process of diffusion throughout the whole of society and within each of its mem-
bers. In analyzing the value of ren in the light of the first two chapters of the 
Lunyu, Robert E.Allinson pointed out that filial piety (xiao 孝) “is considered hy-
pothetical and not categorical in axiological status; […] is not characterised as an 
exclusive form of love, but rather is designed as an epistemological guide and as 
an ontological locus for our ethical feeling and values”.107 The Ru’s ethical vision 
interprets society as an extension of the family structure, an ideal starting point 
99 Mengzi 2A/7; 4A/10; 6A/11; 7A/33.
100 Lunyu 12/22.
101 Mengzi 7B:31; 7A:33.
102 See Mengzi 1A:7; 2A:6; 7A:31.
103 Lin Yü-sheng 1974–1975: 193.
104 Lin Yü-sheng 1974: 188.
105 Hall and Ames 1987: 120–121.
106 See Shuowen jiezi zhu 說文解字注 1988: 365.
107 Allinson 1992: 176, 184.
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to implement the integration and emancipation process of each individual. Con-
fucius stated that “might we not say that filial piety and devotion towards older 
brothers are the basis to become a virtuous person?” (xiao ti ye zhe qi wei ren zhi 
ben yu 孝弟也者其為仁之本與).108
Li Chenyang pointed out:
Why must a person of ren start with loving his parents? The Confucian observe the following 
line of reasoning. From childhood one must begin moral self-cultivation. First social envi-
ronment in which one finds oneself is the family. The first people with whom one is ac-
quainted are, naturally, one’s parents. Therefore, in order for one to become ren, one must 
first learn to be ren with one’s parents; and ren in that aspect is filial piety. […] If one fails to 
be ren at home, namely to be filial to one’s parents while young, it would be difficult to be 
ren to others after one grows up. Therefore, filial piety is the fountainhead of ren, and the 
morality of ren first of all demands filial piety.109
Mencius stressed that the most important duty is fulfilling one’s obligations to-
wards parents, more precisely that “the real application of ren consists in serving 
one’s own relatives” (ren zhi shi shi qin shi ye 仁之實事親是也).110 Following the 
same path, the Zhongyong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean) states that “ren is a 
distinguishing quality of mankind and affection for one’s own parents represents 
its highest expression” (ren zhe ren ye qin qin wei da 仁者人也親親為大)111 and 
the chapter “Jie” 戒 (Admonitions) of the Guanzi 管子 (The Book of Master Guan) 
testifies how “filial piety and devotion towards older brothers are the forerunners 
of ren (xiao ti zhe ren zhi zu ye 孝弟者仁之祖也)”.112
Even if we acknowledge the primary position of the family, it is evident from 
the Ru texts that acting in compliance with the principles of filial piety does not 
necessarily lead to behavior inspired by ren: it is actually necessary to extend 
one’s attention to the elderly members of the community and to all creatures. 
Mencius examined the pervasive nature of ren that, starting from devotion for 
parents, extends to others and finally to the whole society. He stated that “loving 
one’s own parents and family means being ren (qin qin ren ye 親親仁也), respect-
ing the elderly means behaving righteously ( jing chang yi ye 敬長義也). There is 
no other thing to do than to extend these principles to the whole world.”113
108 Lunyu 1/2.
109 Li Chenyang 1997: 222–223.
110 Mengzi 4A/27, transl. Legge 1895: 313, transl. mod. auct.
111 Zhongyong 20.
112 See Guanzi 1b/26.
113 Mengzi 7A/15, transl. Legge 1895: 456, transl. mod. auct.
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The present discussion of the value of ren does not intend to reduce the 
meaning of a philosophical concept – central to the Ru cultural heritage – to a 
mere “devotion towards parents” in order to support our hypothesis. However, it 
should be highlighted how two of the many implications of ren find expression in 
the practice of filial piety and the refusal of the jian ai principle. For instance, Yao 
Xinzhong confronted Mencius’s conception of ren with the Mohist jian ai, trying 
to clarify the inadequacy of the belief that “ren as universal love came in the past 
to be perceived as graded, or partial, love.”114 Commenting on the passage 1/2 
from Lunyu above mentioned – “filial piety and devotion towards older brothers 
are the fundamental principles or the root (ben 本) to become a virtuous person” 
– Yao Xinzhong pointed out how important it is to properly define ben, since
ben (root) in this paragraph means the starting point of practicing ren rather that the 
essence of ren. Ren must be practised in a graded procession, moving from one’s parents to 
others’ parents. […] However, ‘starting with one’s love for family’ does not mean that this 
love is the whole of ren.115 […] All Confucians believe that ren, as love, should first be prac-
tised in one’s love for one’s parents and brothers, but none of them holds that ren is only 
love for parents and brothers.116
Thus, we can better understand the meaning of the debate between the Ru and 
the Mohists as expressed in the Mengzi. It is not a question of debating about the 
contrast between a mutual, universal and unreserved concern, represented by 
jian ai and a gradual, partial and disciplined type of love, typical of ren. In the 
Ruist vision of things, ren already implies an unlimited expansion of one’s love; 
it is love to be universally expanded. The reasons for the clash between the two 
positions, rather, lie in the fact that, for Mencius, the principle of jian ai 
represents an aberration, an unnatural radicalization leading people to treat 
relatives, loved ones and senior people as if they were strangers, requiring the 
same duties towards everyone. We should also remember the utilitarian ground 
justifying the jian ai practice: persuaded that loving people makes people love 
you, that benefiting someone means having something in return, the Mohists 
hold a position conflicting with the Ru’s. In fact, the practice of ren is, for Men-
cius, consistent with natural human inclinations and, more importantly, it should 
be nurtured in a continuous process of moral improvement achieved through the 
process of self-cultivation. 
Mencius could not but oppose the utilitarian implications inherent in jian ai 
and the whole issue regarding the contrast between ren and jian ai should be 
114 Yao Xinzhong 1995: 186.
115 Yao Xinzhong 1995: 186.
116 Yao Xinzhong 1995: 187.
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considered within the more extensive debate in which yi 義 “justice, virtue of 
moral appropriateness” and li 利 “interest, utility” are opposed.
The refusal to consider morality as just a simple matter of evaluating risks 
and benefits represents a constant feature in Ru philosophy, drawing inspiration 
from a passage of the Lunyu in which the Master states that, contrary to the be-
havior of the exemplary person ( junzi 君子), petty men (xiaoren 小人) typically 
aim at their own interest instead of striving towards a morally unexceptionable 
conduct.117 
2.2  Yi 義
Xu Shen’s 許慎 (ca. 58 CE–ca. 147) definition of yi 義 in terms of “the awesome 
decorum of one’s self” ( yi ji zhi weiyi ye 義己之威儀也)118 adheres perfectly with 
the structure of the character used to express such a word. Yi “justice, rightness, 
sense of moral appropriateness” can be graphically and therefore etymologically 
connected to wo 我, insomuch as that the definition given by the Shuowen jiezi 
may be translated as “awesomeness, the dignity, the majesty” or “respectable 
countenance of the self”. In early Chinese texts weiyi can denote specific rules of 
decorum, or simply a respectable countenance or demeanor. The meaning of wei 
威 is usually explained as wei 畏 “awe-inspiring, awesome, frightening”.119 These 
two cognates are often used interchangeably. Awe and anxiety both recall rever-
ence ( jing 敬) and “there is nothing that a gentleman does not revere, but the 
reverence for one’s own person is the most important” ( junzi wu bu jing ye jing 
shen wei da 君子無不敬也，敬身為大).120
In his annotation to Xu Shen’s definition, Duan Yucai 段玉裁 (1735–1815) in-
terprets the character as an example of a huiyi 會意 “syssemantic” based on the 
semantics of two other characters, yang 羊 “sheep, goat” and wo 我 “I, self”. 
Duan Yucai elaborates the definition further: “The dignity and respectable coun-
tenance (weiyi) emerge out of one’s self […] Yi refers to the self” (weiyi chu yu ji gu 
cong wo […] yi zhe wo ye 威儀出于己，故从我[…]義者，我也). Thanks to the pres-
ence of the element yang 羊, yi “shares the same meaning as shan 善 ‘good, aus-
117 See Lunyu 4/16.
118 See Shuowen jiezi zhu 1988: 633.
119 See, for example, the passage you wei er ke wei weizhi wei 有威而可畏謂之威 “having attri-
butes of awesomeness so as to deserve awe, this is what I define ‘awesomeness’ ”, Zuozhuan 
左傳, Xianggong 襄公 31. See Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu 春秋左傳注 (1981)[Jahreszahl wirklich 
hierhin?]: 1194.
120 Liji 禮記 8.3.
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picious’ and mei 美 ‘beautiful’ ” (cong yang zhe yu shan mei tongyi 从羊者，與善
美同意)” concludes Duan Yucai.
Unlike other first-person pronouns, in the opinion of some scholars, wo refers 
exactly to the status of pre-eminence of the subject, to the fact that he/she stands 
out while affirming him/herself in the process of personal achievement as a sub-
ject endowed with moral authority.121 It is no coincidence that Mencius stressed 
that “the Ten Thousand Creatures are completed in me” (wanwu jie bei yu wo yi 
萬物皆備於我矣),122 thus confirming that “the process of dissolving the barrier 
between self and environment involves disciplining the ego-self and becoming 
a person-in-context. This process can alternatively be described as the objecti- 
fication of the self in that it recognizes the correlative and coextensive relation- 
ship between person making and community making, and ultimately, world 
making” and “the personal self (wo 我) that discloses yi is exalted in that it is a 
self-realizing person-in-context”.123
Being a first-person singular and plural pronoun, wo carries two functions, 
an “exclusive” and an “inclusive”. Its “exclusivity” can be highlighted in the most 
commonly understood meaning of wo, i.e. “I”, although wo was primarily a plural 
pronoun “we, us”.
In connection with the emphasis attributed to wo in Yang Zhu’s philosophy, 
John Emerson observed that:
Yang’s principle, “each for himself” (wei wo, literally ‘for me’), is more problematic. How-
ever, it can just as well be translated ‘for us’ or ‘for me and mine’; the word wo can be either 
singular or plural, and, as indicated by Xu, can be used when speaking for one’s family or 
clan. […] It is not at all certain that Yang Zhu or his followers rejected the burdensome obli-
gations of the family. […] The various Chinese words used to express the Yangist positions 
all tend to bear out the theory that Yang Zhu’s teaching was familial.124
121 Herbert Fingarette argues that “ji 己 is used as a term for self-reference, often emphatic […] 
the more ordinary personal pronoun, such as wu 吾 or wo 我, distinguishes me as subject, or 
agent, or possessor, or object; but it does so in an unemphatic way, an unself-conscious, unre-
flexive way”. See Fingarette 1979: 131; 138, note 20. Some scholars noticed that the syntactic 
function of wo has gradually turned from a first-person singular and plural pronoun with a sub-
ject function (11th–7th century B.C.) into a pronoun with a determinative function (7th–3th century 
B.C.). See Dobson 1974: 786–788; see also Hall and Ames 1984: 6–7. See also Boodberg 1953: 
330–332.
122 Mengzi 7A/4. See also Wang Huaiyu 2009.
123 See Hall and Ames 1987: 93–94.
124 Emerson 1996: 549–550.
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Persuaded that “Yang Zhu’s doctrine was solidly founded on Chinese traditions 
of family piety older than Confucius”,125 Emerson considered the main Yangist 
assumptions (amongst them the wei wo principle) as an elaboration of traditional 
values, some of them dating back to a pre-Ru era. We cannot exclude the possibil-
ity that Yang Zhu was a devoted upholder of the centrality of the role of the family 
and that he fulfilled his duties towards his relatives, yet we should carefully eval-
uate Emerson’s assumption and examine it in the light of the available textual 
sources. That the wei wo really represents the essential character of the Yangist 
message stands in need of demonstration. As has already been observed, the 
Mengzi is the only text supporting this interpretation and, considering Mencius’s 
open hostility towards his antagonists, the possibility that wei wo is just a defam-
atory slogan cannot be excluded. Even if we acknowledge that Yang Zhu actually 
supported the wei wo principle, there would still be one more problem: Mencius’s 
critique suggests that in the wei wo expression the character wo only refers to 
one’s own ego, to oneself, rather than to the family. A.C. Graham pointed out that
[…] one may indeed raise the question whether Chinese thought ever poses the problem of 
philosophical egoism as it is understood in the West. Some translators, including myself in 
the past, have translated the phrase wei wo applied by Mencius to Yang Zhu by ‘egoism’ in-
stead of ‘selfishness’. But one has the impression that Chinese thinkers perceive persons as 
inherently social beings who are more or less selfish rather than as isolated individuals who 
will be pure egoists unless taught morality.126
Returning to the relationship between yi and wo, it should be stressed how yi 
in Ru texts is the distinctive characteristic defining one’s personal identity. 
Confucius actually defined yi as the “raw material” (zhi 質) by which exemplary 
persons forge themselves.127 There are valid reasons to believe that originally yi 
referred to a sort of “care for oneself” and hinted at something somehow con-
nected with a sense of honor. In this regard, precise information can be found in 
the combined use, present in some text, of yi and ru 辱 “dishonor, shame”.128 
Commenting on the words by Zi Huazi 子華子, the author of the “Gui sheng” 貴生 
(Giving value to life) chapter of the Lüshi chunqiu points out that there is nothing 
more dishonorable than a morally inappropriate behavior (ru mo da yu bu yi 辱莫
125 Emerson 1996: 548.
126 Graham 1989: 61.
127 See Lunyu 15/18.
128 About ru 辱, see the principle attributed to Song Xing 宋銒 (ca. 360–290 B.C.), who’s main 
doctrine was “not feeling disgraced when insulted” ( jian wu bu ru 見侮不辱). See Zhuangzi 
92/33/36; Xunzi 92/18/93–114; Han Feizi 50.2.27.
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大於不義):129 probably in line with Yang Zhu’s doctrine, a morally inappropriate 
(bu yi 不義) life is a repressed life ( po sheng 迫生).
The interpretation of ru as a fault of yi can also be found in another passage 
from the Lüshi chunqiu130 and in one from the Mozi.131 Yi was perhaps associated, 
at least in Ru sources, with a lack of ru 辱, and, according to Shun Kwong-loi, it 
was also connected with li 禮, since a lack of yi might be compared to the dis-
honor (ru 辱) deriving from falling into disgrace or from being publicly, and thus, 
socially, in open contrast with what is prescribed by li.132
Now moving back to yi’s subjective dimension, it is relevant here to refer to 
Mo Di’s statement that in ancient times, there were as many criteria of yi as 
humans, “and each of them approved their own criterion and disagreed with the 
others.”133 This passage evokes the dramatic scenario of the state of nature at the 
beginning of civilization, when disorder and injustices prevailed. This explains 
the need for the Mohists to keep different moral principles in balance in the inter-
est (li 利) of the entire community, until a time when the ultimate principle could 
be identified that would allow for the maximization of general interest (tianxia zhi 
li 天下之利). Although this view was not reflective of the Ru attitude, like Mozi’s 
followers, the Ru considered that yi is located in the individual. This is demon-
strated by the fact that both the Lunyu and other Ru works attribute a margin of 
discretion when it comes to the identification of what constitutes appropriate 
action.134
Mohists, nonetheless, also conceived a theory in which yi corresponded to 
conformity with the expectations of Heaven:
然則天亦何欲何惡？天欲義而惡不義。然則率天下之百姓以從事於義，則我乃為天之所欲
也。我為天之所欲，天亦為我所欲。然則我何欲何惡？我欲福祿而惡禍祟。若我不為天之
所欲，而為天之所不欲，然則我率天下之百姓，以從事於禍祟中也。然則何以知天之欲
義而惡不義？曰天下有義則生，無義則死；有義則富，無義則貧；有義則治，無義則亂。
然則天欲其生而惡其死，欲其富而惡其貧，欲其治而惡其亂，此我所以知天欲義而惡不義
也。
Now, what does Heaven desire and what does it abhor? Heaven desires rightness and abhors 
unrightness. Therefore, in leading the people in the world to perform their affairs according 
to rightness, I will be doing what Heaven desires, and when I do what Heaven desires, 
Heaven will also do what I desire. Now, what do I desire and what do I abhor? I desire 
blessings and emoluments, and abhor calamities and misfortunes. When I do not do what 
129 See Lüshi chunqiu 2.2/8/13.
130 See Lüshi chunqiu 2.4/9/28.
131 See Mozi 3/3/6.
132 See Shun Kwong-loi 1997b: 58–62.
133 是以人是其義，以非人之義. Mozi 14/11/1.
134 See Lunyu 4/10; 18/8.
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Heaven desires, neither will Heaven do what I desire: then, I should be leading the people 
into calamities and misfortunes. But how do we know Heaven desires rightness and abhors 
unrightness? For, with rightness the world lives and without it the world dies; with it the 
world becomes rich and without it the world becomes poor; with it the world becomes or-
derly and without it the world becomes chaotic. And if Heaven likes to have the world live 
and abhors its death, likes to have it rich and abhors to have it poor, and likes to have it in 
good order and abhors to have it in disorder. Therefore we know Heaven desires rightness 
and abominates unrightness.135
According to Hall and Ames, yi defines the appropriateness of an act towards one-
self, rather than an evaluation of the act within its context.136 However, Shun 
Kwong-loi pointed out that, especially in the Lunyu, yi is used as an attribute of 
both actions and individuals.137 In the Mengzi appropriateness is expressed 
through one’s degree of moral outrage (wu 惡) when realizing that duties have not 
been fulfilled138 and one’s awareness of what one would deem shameful (xiu 羞), 
unworthy or reprehensible for oneself has emerged. Therefore repugnance (wu) 
and shame (xiu) are the telltale signs of yi and yi is identified with what is person-
ally, and by extension, socially recognized as “appropriate”. Yi outlines the strat-
egy to adopt in the process of moral self-cultivation for the purpose of achieving 
a perfect social order.139
In the Chunqiu Fanlu 春秋繁露 (Luxuriant Dew of the Annals), Dong Zhong-
shu 董仲舒 (ca. 179–104 B.C.) confirmed that yi refers to oneself:
以仁安人，以義正我，故仁之为言人也，義之为言我也。 […] 仁之法在爱人，不在爱我。
義之法在正我，不在正人。我不自正，雖能正人，弗予為義。[…] 何可謂義？義者，謂宜
在我者。宜在我者，而后可以称義。故言義者，合我與宜，以為一言。
Ren is essential to pacify others, yi to rectify oneself. Therefore ren refers to others, yi to 
oneself. […] The model that defines ren is based on love for others, not on love for oneself; 
the model of yi is based on rectifying oneself, not other people. Even if I could correct others, 
I should first correct myself otherwise it cannot be said that I complied with what is in-
tended as yi. […] What is the meaning of yi? Yi means appropriateness towards oneself. Only 
an appropriate behavior towards oneself can be defined as “yi”. Therefore yi gathers within 
a single term “self” and “appropriateness”.140
135 Mozi 7/1/2.
136 Hall and Ames 1986: 96.
137 Shun Kwong-loi 1997b: 25–26, 62–63. 
138 Mengzi 2A/6; 43/6A/6.
139 See Hall and Ames 1984: 7; see also 1987: 93: “Where li 利 is to pursue the good on behalf of 
the interests of the ego-self ( ji 己) and is associated with the conduct of the less developed indi-
vidual (xiao ren 小人), yi can be readily identified with the exalted-self (wo 我) and the conduct 
of the exemplary person ( junzi) who pursue the broader good”.
140 Chunqiu Fanlu 8.8a.
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Taking into account a widely shared position among the Ru, one may believe that 
Mencius denigrated Yang Zhu by accusing him of upholding the principle of wei 
wo because he realized that it was based on a dangerous and partial assumption 
of what personal achievement should be. In Mencius’s interpretation of wei wo, 
the status of the subject (wo) is not exalted. On the contrary, it is significantly re-
duced because it must permanently be balanced against the demands of the 
whole context in which the subject is instantiated: if wo is construed in an exclu-
sive sense, totally withdrawn into itself and deprived of its interpersonal dimen-
sion, then it will never express yi in full. It is no coincidence that one of the most 
significant teachings by Confucius is precisely the “refusal to have egoistic atti-
tudes” (wu wo 毋我).141
Besides outlining the duties which one must fulfill, yi implies the principle 
that the legitimacy of these duties is not a matter of arbitrary imposition. For the 
Ru, the requirement to fulfill certain duties is strongly emphasized because they 
are duties towards oneself and others; failure to fulfill them would result in a 
degradation of the self.
An extremely clear example of the value of yi can be found in the passage 
below, taken from the Lunyu. Zilu 子路, after telling Confucius about his encoun-
ter with a recluse ( yinzhe 隱者), makes the following remark:
不仕無義。長幼之節，不可废也；君臣之義，如之何其废之？欲潔其身，而亂大倫。君子
之仕也，行其義也。
Not to take office is not morally appropriate. If the relations between old and young may not 
be neglected, how is it that he sets aside the duties that should be observed between sover-
eign and minister? Wishing to maintain his personal purity, he allows great relations to 
come to confusion. The exemplary person takes office, and performs the righteous duties 
belonging to it. As to the failure of right principles to make progress, he is aware of that.142
The previous passage deserves careful examination, since it will help to better 
understand the contrast between Mencius and Yang Zhu. First, the text states 
that fulfilling one’s duties as a subject by accepting a government office rep-
resents a duty which is in line with yi. We should not forget that Yang Zhu, to 
whom with the doctrine of the renunciation of duties towards the sovereign was 
attributed, is defined as wu jun “disrespectful of [the allegiance due to] the sover-
eign” because he was advocating the wei wo principle.
It can be assumed that Mencius interpreted Yang Zhu’s claims in the same 
way as those of the recluse met by Zilu, i.e. as an attempt at self-defense through 
141 See Lunyu 9/4.
142 Lunyu 18/7.
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the rejection of any external interference which might threaten one’s personal 
safety. Nonetheless, what really matters is that evading one’s duties as subject – 
always giving priority to one’s own wellbeing – means acting against yi, therefore 
there is a clear connection between being egoist (wei wo), withdrawing from one’s 
duties towards the sovereign (wu jun) and yi.
The Mengzi suggests that the correct observance of the relationships between 
subject and sovereign falls within yi.143 In the passage below, Mencius suggests 
that, in spite of what was stated by Mozi, it is through the practice of ren and not 
of jian ai that one achieves proper respect for paternal authority and that, unlike 
for Yang Zhu, the egoistic refusal of government office is not compatible with 
moral appropriateness ( yi): 
孟子曰：「口之於味也，目之於色也，耳之於聲也，鼻之於臭也，四肢之於安佚也，性也，
有命焉，君子不謂性也。仁之於父子也，義之於君臣也，禮之於賓主也，智之於賢者也，
聖人之於天道也，命也，有性焉，君子不謂命也。」
Mencius said: “For the mouth to desire sweet tastes, the eye to desire beautiful colours, the 
ear to desire pleasant sounds, the nose to desire fragrant odours, and the four limbs to 
desire ease and – these things are natural. But there is something which is appointment by 
Heaven in connexion with them, and the superior man does not say of his pursuit of them, 
‘It is my nature’. The exercise ren between father and son, the observance of yi between 
sovereign and minister, the rules of ceremony between guest and host, the display of knowl-
edge in recognising the talented, and the fulfilling the heavenly course by the – these are 
the appointments of Heaven. But there is an adaptation of our nature for them. The superior 
man does not say, in reference to them, ‘It is the appointment of Heaven’.”144
There is another possible, complementary interpretation of Mencius’s argument 
against Yang Zhu and Mo Di. Xie Lizhong 謝力中145 noticed how the wei wo and 
jian ai principles are actually in sharp conflict with the Ru values of xiao 孝 “filial 
piety” and zhong 忠. Moreover, Xie Lizhong underlined the fact that, without 
obeying one’s superiors in the socio-political context and without respecting 
paternal authority in the familiar context, it is impossible to establish a system of 
values allowing interpersonal relation.
143 See Mengzi 3A/4 and Xunzi 64/17/38. See also some “Ru-oriented” bambooo texts from 
Guodian tomb in Jingmen shi bowuguan (ed.) 1998: 168, 188.
144 Mengzi 7B/24, transl. Legge 1895: 489–490, transl. mod. auct. The passage should be in-
terpreted in the light of Mencius’s hostility towards Yang and Mo, in order to justify why Yang 
Zhu was associated with the wu jun principle while Mozi was identified as wu fu, involving the 
principles of ren and yi. It is also my opinion that in this passage Mencius replies to Gaozi 告子 
(ca. 420–350 B.C.), demonstrating that it is unacceptable to define the inclinations of human 
nature in terms of a mere satisfaction of desires and senses.
145 See Xie Lizhong 1957: 14.
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Zhong 忠, usually translated as “loyalty”, is more than just blind obedience 
towards one’s superiors, as recently observed by Paul R. Goldin, who suggested 
“being honest with oneself in dealing with others” as a possible translation.146 
Far from being just a moral parameter demanding passive respect for authority, 
zhong, as underlined by Maurizio Scarpari, also entails the precise duty of making 
other people respect li (ritual conduct).147 This is confirmed in the following pas-
sage of the Lunyu: “When Zigong asked about friendship, The Master replied: 
‘Reprove your friend when dutifulness requires (zhong gao er shan dao zhi 忠告而
善道之), but do so gently. If your words are not accepted then desist, lest you 
incur insult’.”148 In Hall and Ames’ view, zhong means “doing one’s best as one’s 
authentic self”,149 a concept which comes very close to the idea of “behaving 
according to conscientiousness”.150 For example, Confucius pointed out that “the 
lord employs the ministers following the traditional rules of conduct (li 禮), while 
the ministers serve the lord with utmost devotion (zhong).”151
After this brief remark, Xie Lizhong’s interpretation seems more credible, 
since it is likely that Mencius might have severely criticized Yang Zhu because the 
latter did not observe zhong. As for Yang Zhu, he was not interested in standing 
out for his disloyalty and, as probably confirmed by a passage in the chapter 
“Yang Zhu” from the Liezi, he clearly had doubts about the value attributed to 
zhong by the Ru:
忠不足以安君，適足以危身；義不足以利物，適足以害生。安上不由于忠，而忠名滅焉；
利物不由于義，而義名絕焉。君臣皆安，物我兼利，古之道也。
Being ‘zhong 忠 (dutiful)’ is not enough to make the ruler safe; all it can do is endanger 
oneself. Being dutiful is not enough to benefit others; all it can do is interfere with one’s life. 
When it is seen that dutifulness is not the way to make the ruler safe, the good reputation of 
the loyal will disappear; when it is seen that duty is not the way to benefit others, the good 
reputation of the dutiful will come to an end. It was the Way of ancient times that both ruler 
and subject should be safe, both others and oneself should be benefited.152
It has already been remarked that one of the core values defining the appropriate 
behavior of the subject towards the political authority is yi. The semantic fields of 
146 Goldin 2008: 169. Goldin also examines the relationship between zhong 忠 and zhong 中 (p. 
171). On zhong and shu 恕, see also Fingarette 1979, Van Norden 2002: 216–236 and Ivanhoe 1990. 
See also Chan Sin Yee 1999 and Nivison 1996: 59–76.
147 See Scarpari 1991: 42.
148 Lunyu 12/23 (the translation is indebted to Slingerland 2003: 136). See also Liji 10.2/64/20.
149 Hall and Ames 1987: 50; 285–287.
150 See Shun Kwong-loi 1997b: 23, 120.
151 Lunyu 3/19; see also Lunyu 2/20, 5/19, 12/14.
152 Liezi 7/44/5.
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zhong and yi are clearly different, but there apparently is some complementarity 
as far as the relationship between the subject and the sovereign is concerned, as 
documented by the passage above. The Liji 禮記 (Record of Ritual), when defining 
the morally appropriate behavior (ren yi 仁義) for each of the fundamental roles, 
specifies that “for the sovereign this means being ren ( jun ren 君仁), for the sub-
ject this means being conscientious (chen zhong 臣忠)”,153 in line with passage 
3/19 of the Lunyu and the above mentioned episode taken from the “Yang Zhu” 
chapter of the Liezi.
Another line from the Liji confirms that “the conscientious minister that 
serves the sovereign and the respectful son that serves his parents draw inspira-
tion from the same fundamental principle” (zhong chen yi hi qi jun xiao zi yi shi qi 
qin qi ben yi ye 忠臣以事其君孝子以事其親其本一也).154
Although zhong is often used as an attribute of chen 臣 “minister, subject” 
and the duties of chen, as we have already seen, are linked to yi, neither the Lunyu 
nor the Mengzi draws an explicit connection between zhong and yi, to the point 
that that Shun Kwong-loi considers zhong as an expression of ren.155 In spite of 
this, it is proper to assimilate zhong to yi, also because, as pointed out by Li Chen-
yang,156 it is shu 恕 “empathetic understanding in dealings with others”,157 rather 
than zhong, which is closely connected with filial piety and, ultimately, with ren.
In sum, there seem to be enough elements to support the hypothesis that 
by identifying Yang Zhu with a wei wo-wu jun attitude, Mencius saw a distorted 
application of yi 義, while the Mohist jian ai-wu fu principles did not honor ren 
仁:158 by totally devoting oneself to the community and to the state, one cannot 
but violate the code of familiar relations and obligations (like Mozi did); on the 
153 Liji 9/23. See also the Guodian bamboo manuscript identified as Liu de 六德 (The Six 
Virtues), where the virtuosity of the sovereign is defined as yi. See Jingmen shi bowuguan (ed.): 
1998: 167.
154 Liji 25/2. See also Liji 31/1; 33/14.
155 See Shun Kwong-loi 1997b: 120.
156 See Li Chenyang 1997: 227.
157 See Slingerland 2003: 32, 160, 238, 242.
158 This interpretation was originally supported by some of the leading Ru scholars in the Song 
Dynasty (960–1279), who highlighted differences and similarities between the principles advo-
cated by Yang-Mo and ren and yi. For example, according to passage 55:15a in the Mengzi zhu 孟
子注 (Commentary on the Book of Mencius) by Zhu Xi, Yang’s and Mo’s doctrines were more 
dangerous than Han Fei’s and Shen Buhai’s 申不害 (ca. 400–337 B.C.) since “Yang’s egoism may 
be assimilated to yi, while Mo’s unreserved concern for others may be assimilated to ren” ( gai 
Yang shi wei wo yi yu yi Mo shi jian ai yi yu ren 蓋楊氏為我疑於義，墨氏兼愛疑於仁). See Zhu Xi 
in Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集注 1983: 272–273. The Jinsilu 近思錄 (Reflections on Things at 
Hand), an anthology edited by Zhu Xi and Lü Zuqian 呂祖謙 (1137–1181), records a statement by 
Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085) stressing the affinity between Yang Zhu’s egoism and yi, on the one 
hand, and between Mozi’s doctrine and ren, on the other. Nonetheless, it should be noticed that 
  The Yang Mo 楊墨 dualism   1167
other hand, by refusing to be concerned with the community and to serve the 
sovereign, one fails to accomplish one’s civic duties (like Yang Zhu did). Yang and 
Mo were therefore portrayed as figures who represented two opposite points of 
view, denying respectively the authority of the sovereign by promoting a radical 
ethical egoism, and the claims of familiar devotion towards one’s father in favor 
of an unbalanced concern for others. In this sense, the Yang-Mo symbol opposed 
both extremism and immorality.
As already pointed out, Mencius’ mastery of argumentative devices like 
inventio, imitatio, exaggeratio reinforced his opposition to the heresies with a 
powerful dual rhetorical representation of moral deviances. One possible reason 
for enduring influence of the Yang-Mo symbol is the fact that it expressed the 
basic tension present within ancient Chinese society between dutiful love and 
respect toward one’s parents and ancestors (xiao 孝) and state loyalty and self- 
abnegation (zhong 忠). At the same time, the Yang-Mo symbol also provided the 
Ru – at least the lineage closer to Mencius – with a response to that tension: to 
hold the “mean” between two pernicious and radical extremes by making use of 
a perceptive and proper evaluation (quan 權) based on the capacity of one’s 
heart/mind to discern.
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